Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1988

Davis v. Davis : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
G. Michael Westfall; Gallian & Westfall; Attorney for Respondent.
Gary W. Pendleton; Attorney at Law; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Davis v. Davis, No. 880452 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1259

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COIIBJ F AP" EALS
UTAH
DOCUMENT

ipna-cft

50
DOCKET NO.

IN (THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARY C. BARTLETT,

Plaintifffpfaiant

Category 14(b)

vs.
WILLIAM P . TROSS,

Case No. 880454-CA

Def endanlf ttR^H»ondent.
BRI.F.F OF APPELLANT

f

APPEAL FROM THEII
UTAH COUNTY, STfl'

URTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
OF UTAH, JUDGE BOYD L. PARK

FREDERICK A. JACKMANi
JACKMAN & JOHNSON
1327 South 800 East
Suite 300
Orem, UT 84058

TERRI C. BINGHAM
WATSON, SCRIBNER & BURROWS
2696 N. University Avenue
Suite 220
Provo, UT 84604

Attorney for Respon&&Hil

Attorney for Appellant

NOV 15 1988

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARY C. BARTLETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant

Category 14(b)

vs.
WILLIAM P. TROSS,

Case No.

880454-CA

Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, JUDGE BOYD L. PARK
FREDERICK A. JACKMAN
JACKMAN & JOHNSON
1327 South 800 East
Suite 300
Orem, UT 84058

TERRI C. BINGHAM
WATSON, SCRIBNER & BURROWS
2696 N. University Avenue
Suite 220
Provo, UT 84604

Attorney for Respondent

Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
FEDERAL STATUTES AND STATE STATUTES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
DISPOSITION OF COURT BELOW
STATEMENT OF FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
POINT I — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO IMPLY INTO THE DECREE OF DIVORCE THE
RULES PROMULGATED BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE
DISSOLUTION DECREE
POINT II — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO FIND A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
PRIOR TO MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DISSOLUTION
REGARDING FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAX
EXEMPTIONS
POINT III — THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED THE
FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS
FOR THE MINOR CHILDREN TO THE DEFENDANTRESPONDENT IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW . . .
POINT IV — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER CHILD CARE EXPENSES,
LIFE INSURANCE EXPENSES, ENTERTAINMENT

1

EXPENSES AND CHRISTMAS PRESENT EXPENSES
FOR THE MINOR CHILDREN IN DETERMINING
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS
THE MINOR CHILDREN'S SUPPORT
CONCLUSION

28
30

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL STATUTES
United States Constitution, Article IV,
Clause 2

3

26 U.S.C. 152(e)

3
STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(e)

2

CASES
Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996 (Utah, 1987)

...

25

Becker v. Becker. 694 P.2d 608 (Utah, 1984)

...

23

Fullmer v. Fullmer. 91 Utah Adv.Rpts. 25
(Sept. 16, 1988)

27

Lord v. Shaw. 682 P.2d 853 (Utah, 1984)

23

Martinez v. Martinez, 90 Utah Adv.Rpts. 35
(Apr. 19, 1988)

27

Miner v. Miner. 706 p.2d 1060 (Utah, 1985) . . . .

23

Woodward v. Woodward,. 709 P.2d 393 (Utah, 1985)

23

iii

.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARY C. BARTLETT,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant

: Category 14(b)

vs.

:

WILLIAM P. TROSS,

: Case No.

Defendant-Respondent.

880454-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this
domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §782a-3(2)(g).
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a final Order Modifying A Decree of
the Fourth Judicial

District

Court, Judge

Boyd

L. Park

presiding, in which the lower court modified a Decree of
Dissolution and Separation Agreement entered by the Common
Pleas Court of Green County, Ohio, Division of Domestic
Relations, in regard to the sale of the marital residence,
visitation, medical insurance on the minor children, and

1

federal and state tax exemptions.

The Court also entered a

restraining order forbidding the parties from taping telephone
conversations, or otherwise bothering or harassing the other
party.

It is from the court's award of the federal and state

tax exemptions for the minor to defendant-respondent, the
noncustodial parent, from which plaintiff-appellant!s seeks
relief.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the trial court err in failing to imply into

the Decree of Divorce the rules promulgated by the Internal
Revenue Service pursuant to the terms of the Dissolution
Decree?
II.

Did the trial court err in failing to find a

material change of circumstances prior to modifying the Decree
of

Dissolution

regarding

federal

and

state

income

tax

exemptions?
III.

Did the trial court award the federal and state

income tax exemptions for the minor children to the defendantrespondent in violation of federal law?
IV.

Was the award of the federal and state income tax

exemptions

for the minor children to defendant-respondent an

abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
FEDERAL STATUTES AND STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-5(3):
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
2

subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the property as
is reasonable and necessary.
United States Constitution. Article IV, Clause 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, of which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
26 U.S.C. 152 (e)
1)
Custodial parent gets exemption.—Except as
otherwise provided in this subsection, i f —
A) a child (as defined in section 151(c)(3))
receives over half of his support during the
calendar year from his parents—
i) who are divorced or legally separated
under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance,
ii) who are separated under a written
separation agreement, or
iii) who live apart at all •times during
the last 6 months of the calendar year, and
B) such child is in the custody of one or both
of his parents for more than one-half of the
calendar year,
such child shall be treated, for purposes of
subsection (a) , as receiving over half of his
support during the calendar year from the parent
having custody for a greater portion of the calendar
year (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as
the "custodial parent").
2) Exception where custodial parent releases claim
to exemption for the year.—A child of parents
described in paragraph (1) shall be treated as
having received over half of his support during a
calendar year from the noncustodial parent i f —
3

A) the custodial parent signs a written
declaration
(in such manner and form as the
Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such
custodial parent will not claim such child as a
dependent for any taxable year beginning in such
calendar year, and
B) the noncustodial parent attaches such
written declaration to the noncustodial parent's
return for the taxable year beginning during such
calendar year.
For
purposes
of
this
subsection,
the
term
"noncustodial parent" means the parent who is not
the custodial parent*
3) Exception for multiple-support agreement.—This
subsection shall not apply in any case where over
half of the support of the child is treated as
having been received from a taxpayer under the
provisions of subsection (c).
4)

Exception for certain pre-1985 instruments.—

A) In general.—A child of parents described
in paragraph (1) shall be treated as having received
over half his support during a calendar year from
the noncustodial parent i f —
i) a qualified pre-1985 instrument between
the partnes applicable to the taxable year beginning
in such calendar year provides that the noncustodial
parent shall be entitled to any deduction allowable
under section 151 for such child, and
ii) the noncustodial parent provides at
least $600 for the support of such child during such
calendar year.
For purposes of this subparagraph, amounts expended
for the support of a child or children shall be
treated as received from the noncustodial parent to
the extent that such parent provided amounts for
such support.
B)
Qualified
pre-1985
instrument.—For
purposes of this paragraph, the term "qualified pre1985 instrument" means any decree of divorce or
separate maintenance or written agreement—
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i) which is executed before January 1,
1985,
ii) which on such date contains the
provision described in subparagraph (A(i), and
iii) which is not modified on or after
such date in a modification which expressly provided
that this paragraph shall not apply to such decree
or agreement.
5) Special rule for support received from new spouse
of parent.—For purposes of this subsection, in the
case of the remarriage of a parent, support of a
child received from the parent's spouse shall be
treated as received from the parent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an appeal from a final Order modifying a Decree
of Dissolution and Supplemental Agreement entered after a
trial on plaintiff-appellant's Complaint (Petition to Modify)
and defendant-respondent's Counterclaim (Counter Petition to
Modify) in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Boyd L.
Park presiding, in which the lower court modified a Decree of
Dissolution in the Common Pleas Court of Greene County, Ohio,
Division of Domestic Relations, which Decree of Dissolution
was entered on the 14th day of November, 1984.

Said Ohio

Dissolution Decree had been properly registered in the Fourth
Judicial District Court pursuant to the full faith and credit
given to foreign decrees in the State of Utah.

5

B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

The Decree of Dissolution was originally signed in this
matter by the Honorable Judge Judson L. Shattuck, Jr., in the
Common Pleas Court of Greene County, Ohio, Division

of

Domestic Relations, and subsequently filed with the same court
on November 14, 1984.

(R. 6-18) Paragraph 2 of the Order of

the Court required both parties to "fulfill each and every
obligation imposed by the Separation Agreement and Supplement
Agreement contained herein and agreed to by the petitioners."
(R.7)
In paragraph 4 of the Supplemental Agreement entered into
by the parties, it states as follows:
Concerning tax exemptions, the husband shall be
entitled to claim all of the minor children on his
federal, state and city income tax returns for the
calendar year 1984. For the calendar years 1985,
and thereafter, the rules promulgated by the
Internal Revenue Service shall apply in making such
determination(s). (R. 18)
Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant moved from Ohio to the
State of Utah. On or about December 23, 1986, plaintiff filed
a Petition to Modify the Ohio Decree of Divorce regarding
delinquent

child

support, medical

expenses and

the real

property of the parties located at 426 Lewis Drive, Fairborn,
OH.

(R. 1-18)

Defendant-respondent

filed an Answer and

Counterclaim alleging, among other things, that defendantrespondent be

awarded

the

federal

and

state

exemptions for the minor children. (R. 19-24)

6

income

tax

On or about the 22nd day of September, 1987, Commissioner
Howard H. Maetani, Domestic Relations Commissioner of the
Fourth Judicial District Court ruled regarding the issues
pending

on plaintiff-appellant's

respondent's Counter Petition.
state

income

tax

exemptions

Petition

and defendant-

Regarding the federal and
for

the

minor

children,

Commissioner Maetani stated as follows:
Defendant shall have the minor children of the
parties for the purpose of income tax deductions or
exemptions as long as defendant is responsible for
the mortgage payment on the Ohio home as set out in
paragraph 3, and defendant is current on his child
support obligation for the year in question. (R.
60)
Consequently, on the 10th day of July, 1987, plaintiffappellant

filed

her

objection

to

the

Commissioner's

Recommendation in which she objected to the Court awarding
defendant-respondent
exemption

for

the

the
minor

federal

and

children,

state

since

income

tax

she, with

the

assistance of her husband, paid over 57% of the total cost and
expenses necessary for the support of the minor children. (R.
41-44 and R. 62-63)

The matter was subsequently referred to

the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park on plaintiff-appellant's
objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation and scheduled
for trial on November 16, 1987 at 1:30 p.m.
C.

(R. 64)

DISPOSITION OP COURT BELOW.

Trial was held as scheduled before the Honorable Judge
Boyd L. Park on the 16th day of November, 1987.
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Plaintiff-

appellant appeared and was represented by her attorney, Jay
Fittf and defendant-respondent appeared and was represented
by his attorney, Frederick A. Jackman.

(R. 65)

No evidence

was introduced at trial by either party in regards to what the
status of the parties was at the time of the decree of divorce
in this matter on the 14th day of November, 1984, wherein
defendant-respondent was awarded the federal, state and city
income tax exemptions for the minor children, but that in the
years 1985 and following the rules promulgated by the Internal
Revenue Service would apply in making such determinations.
(R. 220-289)

Consequently, there was no evidence introduced

at trial from which it could be determined that a material
change of circumstances had taken place for purposes of
modifying the existing decree of divorce between the parties.
Instead, the evidence introduced at trial centered on the
current circumstances between the parties and what percentage
of contribution each had made towards the support of the
children.

The evidence introduced at trial in this matter

showed that plaintiff-appellant spent approximately $1,000.00
per month for the support of the minor children

(R. 241)

Defendant-respondent pays approximately $481.00 per month for
child support of the minor children. Consequently, plaintiffappellant argued that she paid more than one-half of the
children's monthly

living expenses.

[$1,000.00 per month

living expenses was that amount left over after the court had
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refused to allow plaintiff to include child care expenses,
life insurance expenses for the minor children, entertainment
expenses and Christmas present expenses. (R. 223-240)]
After

hearing

the

evidence,

the

court

ruled

that

defendant should be entitled to the federal and state income
tax exemptions for the minor children for the years 1987 and
1988 if defendant-respondent's child support was kept current,
and following the year 1988, the parties were to cooperate and
work out tax exemptions:
I'm going to award the income tax exemptions to the
defendant for 1987 and unless that is provided that
he is current with his child support. If he is
current for his child support in 1988 I am going to
award him the tax exemptions for 1988 because the
plaintiff will not graduate until April of 1988.
Her husband is in the process of lifting himself up
in a new position, so it appears that through 1988
certainly the plaintiff will be, or rather the
defendant, will be putting out the bulk of the
money.
Following the year 1988, I don't have a formula but
following the year 1988 I think the parties should
be ordered to cooperate with regard to tax
exemptions and possibly split tax exemptions so that
the plaintiff has some based somewhat on the ratio
of the total incomes that are coming into both
households and the total parties that are being
supported by those incomes, and that is going to
require a little cooperation but I think it is well
worth it to sit down and think about it when you do.
You may also add the language to the extent that the
cooperation creates the greatest cash flow to the
two families for the purpose of rearing the
children. (R. 283 & 284)
Plaintiff-appellant subsequently filed a motion for a new
trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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alleging the court's decision regarding the federal and state
income tax exemptions of the minor children was against the
law, or in the alternative, was in error of law. (R. 78-92)
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied by the court in
a

ruling

dated

the

29th

day

of

June,

1988.

(R.

213)

Plaintiff-appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on July 28,
1988.

(R. 214)
D.

STATEMENT OP PACTS,

Plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondent were married
in Gordonsville, VA on December 21, 1973.

(R. 6)

During the

course of their marriage, five children were born as issue of
said marriage, to wit: Jonathan E. Tross, born September 4,
1975; Rozanna L. Tross, born September 2, 1976; Jefferson S.
Tross, born December 30, 1977; Cameron M. Tross, born March
14, 1979; and Michel D. Tross, born September 3, 1981. (R. 6
& 9)
The parties were subsequently divorced by a Decree of
Dissolution

on

the

14th day

of November,

1984, by

the

Honorable Judge Judson L. Shattuck, Jr. in the Common Pleas
Court of Greene County, Ohio Division of Domestic Relations.
(R. 6-18)

In said Decree of Dissolution, plaintiff-appellant

was given the custody of the minor children of the parties
with reasonable visitation to defendant-respondent. (R. 11 &
12) Defendant-respondent was ordered to pay $120.00 per month
in child support for each of the minor children of the parties
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by military allotment (R. 12) .

However, said child support

was to abate fully for three months during each summer when
defendant-respondent exercised his visitation with the minor
children. (R. 17)
During the marriage and at the time of the decree of
divorce, plaintiff-appellant was not employed outside the
home.

However,

it was

contemplated

in

the

Decree

of

Dissolution, that plaintiff-appellant would move with the
minor children to the State of Utah to pursue her education
at Brigham Young University. (R. 17) Consequently, defendantrespondent was awarded the 1984 income tax exemptions for the
minor children.

In the years 1985 and thereafter, however,

the rules promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service would
be applicable in making such determinations.

(R. 18)

Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant moved from Ohio to the
State of Utah where she began pursuing her education at
Brigham

Young

University

in

Provo, Utah, where

it was

anticipated plaintiff-appellant would complete her bachelor's
degree in April, 1988.

(R. 223)

In addition, plaintiff-

appellant has remarried and currently resides in the State of
Utah with her new spouse, his son from a prior marriage, and
the five children that were issue of her marriage to the
defendant-respondent.

(R. 231)

At the time of the hearing

before the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park, plaintiff-appellant's
husband was working for the 7-11 Corporation (R. 255).
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Defendant-respondent had also moved from the State of
Ohio.

Defendant-respondent, however, was still employed with

the military and earned approximately $38,000 per year.

(R.

268)
Plaintiff-appellant filed her Petition to Modify Decree
of Divorce on December 23, 1986 alleging that defendantrespondent was consistently in arrears in child support; the
visitation

schedule

defendant-respondent

caused
had

hardship

on

the

children;

failed to maintain the military

allotment for purposes of paying child support; defendantrespondent

had

extraordinary

failed

and

refused

medical

and

dental

respondent

harassed

insignificant

decisions

contacted

him

pursuant

to

make

payments

expenses;

plaintiff-appellant
involving
to

the

the
Decree

defendantregarding

children
of

of

when

she

Divorce;

and

defendant-respondent had failed to allow plaintiff-appellant
any knowledge or choice of the identity of the real estate
broker with whom the marital home in Ohio had been listed for
sale, and was not making any attempt to sell the property but
was merely collecting the rent therefrom.

In addition,

plaintiff-appellant asserted that she had been required to
hire the services of an attorney to represent her in the
action and requested her reasonable court costs and attorneys
fees. (R. 1-5)
Defendant-respondent filed his Answer and Counterclaim
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to plaintiff-appellant's Petition to Modify alleging that any
rent on the marital property which is insufficient to cover
the mortgage payment should be equally split between the
parties and that any deficiencies in the sale of the marital
property should be divided equally between the parties; the
defendant-respondent should be entitled to perform all of the
church ordinances having to do with the children as provided
by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; should
appellant-plaintiff
restrained

from

remarry,

that

interferring

with

defendant-respondent

her
the

new

husband

relationship

has with the minor children

be
that

of the

parties; that both parties be required to maintain medical
hospitalization, dental insurance on the minor children of the
parties, and that they otherwise split equally any amounts not
covered

by

insurance; defendant-respondent

be

given

the

federal tax exemptions for the minor children; that plaintiffappellant not be allowed to record telephone conversations
between herself and defendant-respondent, and that plaintiffappellant's petition to modify had not been brought in good
faith

and

therefore

that

defendant-respondent

should

be

awarded his court costs and attorney's fees in bringing the
matter before the court. (R. 19-24)
A pre-trial settlement conference was had before the
Honorable Commissioner Howard H. Maetani on the 29th day of
June, 1987.

After hearing arguments of counsel, the court
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ruled as follows:
1.

That the real property located in Ohio would be

listed for sale, and the net proceeds or net loss of sale
should be equally divided between the parties.
2.

That the parties should alternate the period each

year during the children's Christmas vacation from 5:00 p.m.
on the day before Christmas vacation begins until 9:00 p.m.
on the day before the Christmas vacation period ends.
3.

That defendant-respondent should be entitled to

perform all church ordinances having to do with the children
as provided by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints,
4.

That the parties were restrained from interferring

with the visitation of the other party or from the other
party's relationship with the children and further, ordering
the parties to take the necessary steps to restrain third
parties from interferring with the children's relationship
with either parent.
5.

That both parties be required to maintain medical,

hospital and dental insurance on the minor children and to
split equally any amounts not covered by insurance. Further,
it was

ordered

children

treated

that
at

plaintiff-appellant
a

military

have

installation

the
if

minor

at

all

possible.
6. That defendant have the minor children of the parties
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for the purposes of income tax deductions or exemptiosn.
7.

That neither party

be allowed

to tape record

conversations with the other party.
8.
child

That so long as defendant-respondent is paying his

support through military

allottment that he shall

determine the total amount of child support due for the year
and divide that by twelve, and that shall be the amount due
for the military allotment.
9. That defendant-respondent have additional visitation
with the minor children not more than three times during each
calendar year by giving the plaintiff-appellant at least two
weeks notice of his intent to visit.
10.

That both parties submit affidavits of attorneys

fees within 10 days for further consideration by the court.
(R. 46-51)
Plaintiff-appellant

filed

her

objection

to

the

Commissioner's Recommendation on or about September 30, 1987.
(R. 62-63)

Consequently, trial was held on the matter before

the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park on the 16th day of November,
1987.
After hearing the evidence, the Court made the following
modifications to the Commissioner's Recommendation:
1.

With regard to the real property in Ohio, that

defendant be responsible for payment of the mortgage on the
property and in the event the property was rented, that the

15

rent first be applied to the mortgage payment.

In addition,

any deficiency would be borne solely by defendant-respondent.
After sale, any net proceeds of the sale should be divided
equally between the parties.
2.

That defendant be required to maintain medical and

dental expenses for the minor children unless plaintiff can
have the children insured without extra cost to her, and that
the parties otherwise split equally any amounts not covered
by insurance.
3. That the defendant should have additional visitation
with the children not more than three times during each
calendar year by giving the plaintiff at least two weeks
notice of his intent to visit.

In addition, plaintiff-

appellant was ordered to advise the defendant-respondent in
advance regarding the major plans of her family.
4.

Defendant-respondent was awarded attorney's fees in

an amount equal to any child support arrearage, and the
attorney's fees were ordered to offset such arrearage.

(R.

221-228)
Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant moved for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
alleging that the decision of the judge was against the law
and that material evidence was not introduced at trial as a
result of inadequate representation by plaintiff-appellant's
attorney.

(R. 78-92) More specifically, plaintiff-appellant
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alleged that the award of the federal and state income tax
exemptions for the minor children was against the law in that
it violated 26 U.S.C. Section 152(e).

The Honorable Judge

Boyd L. Park denied plaintiff-appellant's motion on the 29th
day of June, 1988. (R. 213) Consequently, plaintiff-appellant
filed her Notice of Appeal on the 28th day of July, 1988
regarding the decision of the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park in
regards

to

the

award

of

federal

and

state

income

tax

exemptions of the minor children to defendant-respondent.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in failing to imply into the Decree
of Divorce the rules promulgated by the Internal Revenue
Service pursuant to the terms of the Dissolution Decree.
Paragraph

4

of

the

Supplemental

Agreement

incorporated into the Decree of Dissolution

which

was

by reference

stated that defendant-respondent should be entitled to the
federal and state income tax exemptions for the minor children
for the year 1984. However: "for the calendar years 1985 and
thereafter, the rules promulgated by the Internal Revenue
Services shall apply in making such determination(s)." (R. 18)
Consequently, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e) must be implied into the
Decree of Dissolution for purposes of determining who was
entitled to the federal and state income tax exemptions for
the minor children.
Under the current provisions of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e)
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(1988), the custodial parent is entitled to the dependency
exemptions for the minor children of the parties.

The term

"custodial parent" is defined in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e)(1)(b)
as a parent who has physical custody of the child for more
than one-half of the calendar year.
present action plaintiff-appellant

Consequently, in the

would

be the

custodial

parent of the minor children since she has the minor children
in her physical custody for approximately 9 1/2 months out of
each year.
Defendant-respondent would be entitled to the federal and
state income tax exemptions for the minor children under the
current version of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e) (1988), only if the
custodial parent signs a written waiver that he or she will
not claim the child as a dependent, or if there is a qualified
pre-1985 decree providing that the noncustodial parent is
entitled

to

the

exemption

and

the

non-custodial

parent

provides at least $600.00 per year for the child's support.
Neither of these exceptions are applicable, and therefore, by
virtue of the Decree of Dissolution which implied into it the
laws as enacted by the Internal Revenue Service, plaintiffappellant should be entitled to the federal and state income
tax exemptions for the minor children.
The second error of the trial court is failure to find
a material change of circumstances prior to modifying the
Decree of Dissolution regarding the federal and state income
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tax exemptions for the minor children.

There was no finding

by the trial court of material change of circumstances for
purposes of modifying the existing decree of divorce regarding
the income tax exemptions for the minor children.

There was

no evidence presented by either party as to what circumstances
existed between the parties at the time of the decree of
divorce for purposes of determining whether a material change
of circumstances had taken place.

The trial court merely

based their determination of federal and state income tax
exemptions between the parties by virtue of the fact that
plaintiff-appellant was obtaining her education at Brigham
Young

University

and

defendant-respondent

was

was

not

employed

currently
with

employed,

and

the military

and

earning approximately $38,000.00 a year. (R. 280-289)

There

was no indication of a material change of circumstances
substantial and material enough for purposes of modifying the
decree of divorce to allow defendant-respondent to claim the
minor children as income tax exemptions.
Instead, in determining which of the parties should
receive the federal and state income tax exemptions, the trial
court centered its analysis on who had provided the most
financial support for the minor children.

This method of

analysis is no longer relevant under the current status of the
Federal Internal Revenue Code, which awards the dependency
exemption for the minor children to the custodial parent
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unless the custodial parent signs a declaration stating he or
she will not be claiming the minor children as dependents on
the custodial parent's return, or there is a qualified pre1985 decree awarding the exemptions to the non-custodial
parent.

Such is not the case in the present action.

However, even assuming arguendo that the proportion of
contribution towards the minor children's support is the
proper yardstick for determining who should get the federal
and state income tax exemptions for the minor children, the
trial court erred in failing to consider child care expenses,
life insurance expenses, entertainment expenses and gift
expenses

incurred

by

plaintiff-appellant's

plaintiff-appellant
contributions

in

toward

determining
the

total

children's annual support.
However, under the current status of 2 6 U.S.C. Sec.
152(e), and the express wording of the Decree requiring that
the Internal Revenue Code be implied into the Decree of
Divorce in making future determinations regarding who should
receive the federal and state income tax exemptions for the
minor children, the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding the same to the defendant-respondent.

Consequently,

the trial court's decision should be reversed, and plaintiffappellant

should

receive

the

federal

exemptions for the minor children.
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and

state

income

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPLY INTO
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE THE RULES PROMULGATED BY THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF
THE DISSOLUTION DECREE,
The parties to this action were divorced on November 14,
1984 pursuant to a Decree of Dissolution

signed by the

Honorable Judge Judson L. Shattuck, Jr. in the Common Pleas
Court of Greene County, Ohio, Division of Domestic Relations,
The Decree of Dissolution stated in paragraph 2 as follows:
The petitioners are ordered to fulfill each and
every obligation imposed by the separation agreement
and supplemental agreement contained herein and
agreed by the petitioners.
The Supplemental Agreement attached to the Decree of
Dissolution and incorporated therein by reference, stated in
Article IV, paragarph 4, as follows:
Concerning tax exemptions, the husband shall be
entitled to claim all of the minor children on his
federal, state and city income tax returns for the
calendar year 1984. For the calendar years 1985,
and thereafter, the rules promulgated by the
Internal Revenue Service shall apply in making such
determination(s).
Consequently, by virtue of Article IV, Para. 4 of the
Supplemental Agreement, the Court must imply into the Decree
of Divorce the current provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
regarding the federal income tax exemptions for the minor
children.
The current provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
provide that the custodial parent is entitled to the income
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tax dependency exemptions for the minor children. [26 U.S.C.
Sec, 152(e)]

The child is treated "as having received over

half of his support during the calendar from the parent having
custody for a greater portion of the calendar year. 26 U.S.C.
Sec. 152(e)(1)(b). Therefore, by virture of implying into the
Decree of Dissolution the provisions of U.S. U.S.C. Section
152(e), the custodial parent is presumed to have contributed
the most towards the minor child's support.
In the present action, the Decree of Dissolution between
the parties awarded plaintiff-appellant custody of the five
minor children of the parties with visitation to defendantrespondent. (R. 16 & 17) Plaintiff-appellant has the physical
care,

custody

and

control

of

the

minor

children

for

approximately 9 1/2 months out of each calendar year and
therefore is entitled to the dependency exemption for the
minor children pursuant to 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e)(1).
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A
MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO MODIFYING
THE DECREE OF DISSOLUTION REGARDING FEDERAL AND
STATE INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(3) allows the court
continuing jurisdiction
...to make subsequent changes or new orders for the
support and maintenance of the parites, the custody
of the children and their support, maintenance,
health and dental care, or the distribution of the
property as is reasonable and necessary.
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However, before a modification to a decree of divorce can be
made, the party requesting the modification must show that a
substantial change of circumstances has occurred since the
time of the decree of divorce justifying modification of the
decree.

See Mineer v. Mineer, 706 P«2d 1060 (Utah, 1985),

Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah, 1984), Lord v. Shaw, 682
P,2d 853 (Utah, 1984), and Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393
(Utah, 1985).
The transcript of the hearing that transpired on the 16th
day of November, 1987 is devoid of any evidence of what the
circumstances of the parties were at the time of the decree
of divorce in this matter.

(R. 220-289)

Evidence mainly

consisted of testimony by plaintiff-appellant and defendantrespondent regarding their present financial circumstances.
(R. 223-245 wherein plaintiff-appellant testifies regarding
her

financial

situation

and

R.

267

wherein

defendant-

respondent testifies that he is desirous of having the federal
income tax exemptions for the minor children.)
After hearing the evidence as presented by the parties,
the court expressed its feelings as follows:
Well you heard my feelings about that, and that is
that I am concerned about creating the largest
stream of cash flow for the benefit of the children
and I don't see any reason to forego anything if we
can avoid it and pay the government. I realize that
you get your money from the government, but I think
they have got their hand in their pocket as deep as
I would like to see it. I don't see any reason to
make an order that would allow them to stick it in
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there any deeper.

(R. 269)

The Court then entered its order as follows:
I am going to award the income tax deductions to the
defendant for 1987 and unless and that is provided
that he is current with his child support. If he
is current for his child support in 1988, I am going
to award him the tax exemptions for 1988 because the
plaintiff will not graduate until April of 1988.
Her husband is in the process of lifting himself up
to a new position, so it appears that through 1988
certainly the plaintiff, but rather the defendant,
will be putting out the bulk of the money.
Following the year 1988 I don't have a formula but
following the year 1988 I think the parties should
be ordered to cooperate with regard to tax
exemptions and possible split tax exemptions so that
plaintiff has some and defendant has some based
somewhat on the ratio of the total incomes that are
coming into both households and the total parties
that are being supported by those incomes and that
is going to require a little cooperation but I think
it is well worth it to sit down and think about it
when you do it. You may also add the language to
the extent that the cooperation creates the greatest
cash flow to the two families for the purposes of
rearing the children. (R. 283-284)
The court's decision is absent any specific findings
regarding what material change of circumstances had occurred
to prompt the court to award the state and federal dependency
exemptions to defendant-respondent.
The court also failed to set forth detailed findings of
fact regarding its decision to award defendant the dependency
exemptions. The court has merely stated in paragraph 8 of its
order as

follows: "that defendant

shall have the minor

children of the parties for purposes of income tax deductions
or exemptions for the years 1987 and 1988 if the child support
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is kept current and following the year 1988 the parties are
to cooperate and work out that tax exemptions. (R.283-284)
In Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah, 1987), the court
states as follows:
The findings of fact must show that the court's
judgment or decree follows logically from and is
supported by the evidence. The findings should be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusions on each factual issue was reached.
There is no specific finding by the court showing the
reason and basis upon which it found a material change of
circumstances for purposes of modifying the decree of divorce
to require plaintiff to give up the federal and state income
tax exemptions for the minor children of the parties so as to
comply with the standard propounded in Acton v. Deliran.

It

is axiomatic that even the court expressed a desire to create
the greatest flow of income for purposes of rearing the
children, the Court has actually created a lower stream of
income

for

purposes

of

supporting

the

minor

children.

Plaintiff-appellant and her current husband now have less
income because more of it shall be spent in federal and state
income taxes.

Defendant-respondent's income will increase

because of the federal and state income tax exemptions for the
minor children.

However, the amount of increase to the

defendant was not passed on to the minor children through an
increase in child support.
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III. THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED THE FEDERAL AND STATE
INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR THE MINOR CHILDREN TO THE
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT IN VIOLATION OF FFEDERAL LAW.
Although under the general rule of 2 6 U.S.C. Section
152(e) plaintiff-appellant would be entitled to the tax
exemptions for the minor children, 26 U.S.C. Sec, 152(e)(2)
allows basically two exemptions to the custodial parent's
receipt of the federal income tax exemptions for the minor
children:
1.
The custodial parent signs a written
declaration (in such manner and form as the
secretary may by regulations prescribed) that such
custodial parent will not claim such child as a
dependent for any taxable year beginning in such
calendar year, 26 U.S. Code Sec. 152(e)(2)(A)
2.
That there is a pre-qualified 1985
instrument applicable to the taxable year beginning
in such calendar providing that the noncustodial
parent shall be entitled to the federal income tax
exemption
for the minor children, and the
noncustodial parent provides at least $600 of
support for the child during such calendar year.
26 U.S. Code Sec. 152(e)(4)(A)
The first exception to the custodial parent receiving the
federal tax exemption for the minor children would not be
applicable
appellant

in

the

agreed

present

pursuant

action.
to

the

Although
Supplemental

plaintiffAgreement

entered into by the parties that defendant-respondent could
have the minor children for federal income tax purposes for
the calendar year 1984, no such agreement exists between the
parties regarding

the

following taxable years.

Indeed,

plaintiff-appellant is not willing to execute the voluntary
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relinquishment of the dependency exemption for the minor
children. Consequently, the first exception, as above stated,
would not be applicable.
Defendant-respondent maintained

in his opposition to

plaintiff-appellant's motion for a new trial that the court
could order the custodial parent to execute the relinquishment
of federal income tax exemptions for the minor children. (R.
98-100)

In essence, defendant-respondent asserted that the

trial court can order the custodial parent to execute the
written waiver provided for in 16 U.S. Code Sec. 152(e)(2).
However, this court has previously held otherwise.
In the case of Fullmer v. Fullmer, 91 Utah Adv.Rpts. 25
(Sept. 16, 1988), this court stated:
Although many state courts interpreting the
predecessor provisions to Section 152(e) have
determined that they have discretion to award the
exemption in a divorce proceeding, we agree with the
court that have concluded they do not have the
authority to grant the exemption contrary to the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, (citations
omitted)
See also Martinez v. Martinez, 90 Utah Adv.Rpts. 35 (April 19,
1988).
Consequently, the trial court had

no discretion in

determining who should be entitled to the federal and state
income tax exemptions for the minor children. The trial court
had no authority to grant the federal tax exemption to
defendant to which he was not entitled under the Internal
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Revenue Code,
IV, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
CHILD CARE EXPENSES, LIFE INSURANCE EXPENSES,
ENTERTAINMENT
EXPENSES AND CHRISTMAS
PRESENT
EXPENSES FOR THE MINOR CHILDREN IN DETERMINING
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTf 8 CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS THE
MINOR CHILDREN'S SUPPORT.
In determining that defendant-respondent was entitled to
the federal and state income tax exemptions for the minor
children, the court placed a great deal of weight on the
relative contributions of the parties toward the support of
the children.

(R. 269-279)

Under the current status of 26 U.S.C. Sec, 152(e), the
contribution of support by either parent is no longer relevant
for purposes of determining the dependency exemption for the
minor children.

Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the

parent who contributes more to the children's support should
receive the dependency exemptions under the current status of
the federal tax law, the court still erred in its analysis.
The evidence induced at trial in this matter and showed
that plaintiff-appellant spent approximately $1,000 per month
for the support of the minor children. (R. 241)

Defendant-

respondent pays approximately $481 per month for the child
support of the minor children.

Consequently, plaintiff-

appellant pays more than one-half of the children's monthly
living expenses.
In arriving at the $1,000 per month living expenses for
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the minor children, plaintiff-appellant was not allowed to
include

child

care

expenses,

life

insurance

expenses,

entertainment expenses and Christmas present expenses for the
minor children in determining her contribution towards the
childrenfs support. (R. 223-241) Said items were not included
in determining plaintiff-appellant's support for the minor
children because the court deemed them to be discretionary
expenses.
There is no provision in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e) which
distinguishes

between

discretionary

and

nondiscretionary

expenses for the minor children for purposes of determining
who contributes the greatest portion of the child's support.
Indeed, even if there were, the court erred in excluding child
care expenses, life insurance expenses, entertainment expenses
and

Christmas

present

expenses

for

the

children

as

discretionary.
For example, in the case of child care expenses, the new
child support guidelines which are currently in effect and
were proposed by the Utah Child Support Task Force state as
follows:
The reasonable cost of child care expenses actually
incurred to be added to the prior basic child
support need.
The child care costs considered
include child care costs to allow the custodial
parent to work, to look for work, and to complete
education
as a pre-requisite
for obtaining
employment.
Consequently, the new child support schedules in effect
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beginning November 1, 1988 allow child care to be added to the
base amount of child support for purposes of determination of
the amount the noncustodial parent should pay to the custodial
prent. In addition, the child support guidelines are adjusted
to compensate for the fact the federal and state income tax
exemptions for the minor children are awarded to the custodial
parent,

(See Utah Child Support Task Force Report on Proposed

Child Support Guidelines)
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court erred in failing to imply into the decree
of divorce the rules promulgated by the Internal Revenue
Service pursuant to the terms of the Dissolution Decree. Said
decree specifically stated that the rules promulgated by the
Internal Revenue Service would be controlling in determining
who would receive the federal tax exemptions for the minor
children in the years 1985 and thereafter.

By awarding

defendant-respondent the federal and state tax exemptions for
the minor children, the court not only violated the terms of
the Decree of Dissolution

itself, but

failed to

find a

material change of circumstances for purposes of modifying the
existing decree of divorce.

Consequently, the award of the

federal and state income tax exemptions for the minor children
to defendant-respondent was in violation of 26 U.S.C. 152(e)
which currently awards the tax exemptions
children to the custodial parent.
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for the minor

As a result, plaintiff-

appellant seeks relief as follows:
1.

TAX EXEMPTIONS:

A reversal of the order modifying

the Decree of Dissolution to allow defendant-respondent the
federal and state income tax exemptions for the minor children
for the years 1987 and 1988, and the order requiring the
parties to work out the tax exemptions for the years 1988 and
thereafter.

Plaintiff-appellant

seeks

a

return

to

the

original award of tax exemptions as required in the Decree of
Dissolution

which

allowed

the

rules

promulgated

by

the

Internal Revenue Service to control in determining who got the
federal

and

state

income

tax

exemptions

for

the

minor

children.
2.
costs

ATTORNEYS PEES:

to

An award of attorney's fees and

plaintiff-appellant

respondent

for

to

be

plaintiff-appellant's

paid

by

defendant-

attorney's

benefit.

Plaintiff-appellant does not have the financial resources to
pay her attorney's fees and costs in this appeal, she has been
forced to incur such fees and costs to pursue her rights in
the matter.
DATED this

JS( day of November, 1988.

TERRI C. BINGHAM
3?
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following on the
day of November, 1988:
Frederick A. Jackman
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orem, UT 84058

^XCIA.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATS Or UTAH
—ocoOooo—
MARY C. L2ARTLETT,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM P. TROSS,
Civil No. <JV %(p 3/0/

Defendant.
—oooOooo—
The plaintiff,

for cause

of action

against the defendant,

alleges as follows:
1.

The plaintiff

is

a

resident

of

the

State

of Utah

residing in Utah County.
2.

The defendant

is not

a resident of the State of Utah,

being a member of Armed Forces of the United States of America.
3.

The plaintiff and the defendant were

formerly wife and

husband.
4.

The

terminated by

marriage
a

Decree

of

the

of

plaintiff and the defendant was

Dissolution,

a

copy

of

wnich is

attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit "A".
5.

The

said

Decree

of

faith and credit under the laws

Dissolution
of

tne

is entitled to full

United

States

and the

State of Utah.
6.

Paragracn 2)

of the

said Decree

of Dissolution iwakes

reference

to

attached

a

"Separation

hereto

and

made

Agreement",
a

part

a

hereof

copy

of

which is

as Exhibit "B w , and

"Supplemental Agreement", a copy of which is attached

hereto and

made a part hereof as Exhibit "C".
7.

Article

4

of

the said Separation Agreement, entitled

"CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT" granted custody of the minor children
of the

parties to

the plaintiff and provided for the payment of

child support.
8.

Article 4 of the said Separation Agreement was modified

by the said Supplemental Agreement.
9.

The

defendant

has

withheld

child

support,

being

constantly in arrears by at least one month.
10.
due

to

The visitation schedule causes hardship on the children
their

inability

to

participate in organized community

activities which include baseball and other
and during

athletic activities,

the exercise of visitation the defendant speaks badly

of the plaintiff to the children.
11.

The defendant

has

refused

to

maintain

the military

allotment for the purpose of paying chiLd support.
12.

The defendant has failed and refused to make payment of

extraordinary medical,

dental and/or

optical expenses, claiming

that extraordinary should be defined as emergency.
13.

The

Supplemental Agreement contains the provision that

the defendant shall be contacted
children, but
harass the

the defendant's

plaintiff regarding

sions reducing

each and

in

all

matters

regarding the

conduct with regard to this is to
tne most

insignificant c: deci-

every contact between tne plaintiff and

the defendant to a quarrel.
14.

The method of exercise of

visitation by

the defendant

is oppressive to the plaintiff and to the children.
16.

Article

3

of

the said Separation Agreement entitled

"DIVISION OF PROPERTY" provides that real property located at 426
Lewis Drive,

Fairborn, Ohio, be forthwith listed for sale with a

mutually agreeable broker,
exclusive

possession

of

giving
the

the

saia

plaintiff

premises

the

sole and

and requiring the

defendant to make all payments due on the mortgage.
17.

The defendant

plaintiff any

choice in

has

failed

and

refused

to

allow the

the selection of tne real estate broker

or knowledge of the identity of

the real

estate broker selected

by the defendant.
18.

When the

real estate

broker

plaintiff has
selected

by

learned of the identity of the
the

defendant,

the defendant

discharges the real estate broker.
19.

The plaintiff

the purpose of residing

has vacated
in

Utah

the said real property for

County,

Utah,

to

pursue her

education.
20.

The

defendant

has

leased

or

rented

property and has kept the rents to himself;

the

the amount

said real
of which

is unknown to the plaintiff at this time.
21.

The defendant is making no effort to sell the said real

property and is not allowing

the

plaintiff

to

do

anything to

accomplish the sale thereof.
22.

The

plaintiff nas

tance of an attorney at

law

oeen required
for

the

to obtain the assis-

purpose

of

pursuing ner

remedies as prayed herein.
Wherefore the plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant
as follows:
1.
Greene

That the Decree of
County

Ohio,

Dissolution, Common

Division

of

Domestic

Pleas Court of

Relations, Case No

84-Dr-949, be made a decree of trie State of Utah.
2.
as an

That the plaintiff have judgment against
for child

support arrearage

the defendant

in an amount to be proved at

trial.
3.

That the provisions of

child

support

be

modified so

as to eliminate the abatement of child support during the periods
the defendant exercises visitation.
4.
the

That the

children

to

periods of
participate

visitation be
in

modified to permit

community activities and that

visitation be'conducted in a manner not to

be oppressive

on the

plaintiff or on the children.
5.

That the word "extraordinary" be defined liberally with

regard to the payment of medical, dental and optical expenses.
6.
discretion

That the plaintiff be authorized to
regarding

the

children's

exercise custodial

welfare without having to

submit to the defendant's harassment.
7.

That the plaintiff be named the principal agent

of the

parties for the purpose of selling the said real property.
8.

That the

plaintiff have judgment against the defendant

as and for rents received on trie said real property

in an amount

to be provec at trial.
9.

That the

defendant oe

ordered to uay child support by

military pay allotment.
10.

That the plaintiff nave juagment against tne cefencant

as and for attorney's fees in a reasonable ainount to oe proved at
trial.
11.

For sucn other and further relief as

to the

court nay

seem just and meet in the premises.
Dated zhis

23rd day of December*] 1986.

^ ^ a V

x

Fitt

A^tomev

foi-Plaintiff

nr_ED
IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF GREENE COUNTY, OHIO
DIVISION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS

ALICE lirO'A <\ C'.IAK
ql

IN THE MATTER OF:

*

WILLIAM P . TROSS

*

-and-

CASE NO. 84-DR-949
(Judge S h a t t u c k )

*

MARY C. TROSS

DECREE OF DISSOLUTION

*

Petitioners.
The Court f i n d s

*
t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r s , William P. Tross and

Mary C. T r o s s , have each been a r e s i d e n t of the S t a t e of Ohio-and
t h e County of Greene f o r at l e a s t

six

(6) months

immediately,

preceding the d a t e of the f i l i n g of the P e t i t i o n h e r e i n .
The C o u r t f i n d s

that

the P e t i t i o n e r s

were married

G o r d o n s v i l l e , V i r g i n i a , on December 2 1 , 1 9 7 3 , and t h a t f i v e
children,

n a m e l y , J o n a t h a n E . T r o s s , age n i n e

9 / 4 / 7 5 ) , Rozanna L. T r o s s , age e i g h t

(8) years

J e f f e r s o n S. T r o s s , age s i x (6) y e a r s (DOB:
M. T r o s s ,

age f i v e

T r o s s , age t h r e e

(5) years

(3) years

(DOB:

(DOB:

12/30/77),

9/3/81),

(5-)

(9) years (DOB:
(DOB:

3/14/79),

in,

9/2/76))
Cameron

and M i c h e l &.

have b e e n born a s

i s s u e of s a i d m a r r i a g e .
This matter came on f o r h e a r i n g on November 1 4 , 1984, ^nore
than t h i r t y

(30)

days h a v i n g e l a p s e d a f t e r t h e f i l i n g

of

the

P e t i t i o n , the p a r t i e s both appearing p e r s o n a l l y b e f o r e t h e Court.

SCHLAFMAN § AND FODAL

^

^

g ,T

«'/\

*

The C o u r t f i n d s
oath,

voluntarily

Supplemental
Petitioner

is

t h a t the P e t i t i o n e r s ,
entered

Agreement
satisfied

t h a t each P e t i t i o n e r

into

the

embodied

with

desires

the

upon e x a m i n a t i o n

Separation
in

the

terms

of

the

determining property settlement,
alimony,

including

approves

Agreement
Agreements

those

the

submitted
are

fair

Separation
by t h e
and

Petitioners,

equitable,

c o p i e s of w h i c h a r e a t t a c h e d
p a r t of t h i s o r d e r and

hereto,

and

be a n d

the

involved

in
and

the

Court

Supplemental

finds

and f u r t h e r

and

support,

and

and

and

Supplemental

in the s t a t u t e s ,

Agreement

each

dissolved.

factors

child custody

enumerated

that

Petitioners,

relevant

and

Agreements,

t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e S e p a r a t i o n A g r e e m e n t and

Agreement, which i n c l u d e a l l

hereby

said

to have the m a r r i a g e

Upon a r e v i e w of t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e
Petition

Agreement

Petition,

of

under

that

said

orders that

true

t h e same a r e made a

decree.

I T I S , THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t :

1)

The marriage e x i s t i n g between t h e P e t i t i o n e r s b e , and

the same hereby i s , dissolved and the p a r t i e s are hereby released
from the o b l i g a t i o n s of t h e i r marriage, except as h e r e i n a f t e r

set.

forth.
2)

The P e t i t i o n e r s

obligation

i m p o s e d by t h e

Agreement c o n t a i n e d

are

ORDERED t o

Separation

fulfill

e a c h and

A g r e e m e n t and

h e r e i n and a g r e e d by t h e

every

Supplemental

Petitioners.

APPROVED:

'JUDGE/} UD^ON L . 5 HATT'UCK f / /jR / ^ - ^
c~ui Acuaw

ANin P o n A i

SCHLAFMAN AND FODAL CO., L.P.A,
Attorneys for the Petitioner,
Mary C. Tross
By:

*'/?/?*Adfi
Joe R. Fodal

^

SCHLAFMAN AND FODAL

SEPARATION AGREEMENT
This Agreement made and entered into between William P. Tross,
hereinafter referred to as Husband, and Mary C* Tross, hereinafter
referred to as Wife, both of whom represent that:
1.

The parties hereto were married at Gordonsville, Viginia,

on December 21, 1973;
2.

There are five (5) children born as issue of said marriage^

namely, Johnathan E. Tross, age nine (9) years (DOB: 9/4/75),
Rozanna L. Tross, age eight (8) years, (DOB: 9/2/76), Jefferson S.
Tross, age six (6) years (DOB: 12/30/77), Cameron M. Tross, age
five (5) years (DOB: 3/14/79), and Michel D. Tross, age three (3)
years (DOB: 9/3/81);
3.

Differences have arisen between the parties and they are

now living separate and apart from each other;
4.

The parties hereto desire to, and by this Agreement do,

settle and determine and hereby provide for a division of all
property belonging to the parties or to either of them.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the
mutual promises and agreements hereinafter set forth, the parties
hereto agree as follows:
ARTICLE 1. SEPARATION
Each party shall hereafter continue to live separate and apart
from the other, and neither shall annoy, molest, interfere with or
harass the other in any way or manner, either directly or indirectlly

SCHLAFMAN

AND

FODAL

ARTICLE 2. ALIMONY
The Husband shall pay to the Wife no alimony.
ARTICLE 3. DIVISION OF PROPERTY
A) Real Estate;
The Husband and the Wife owns as joint tenants a fee simple
interest in the real estate located at 426 Lewis Drive, Fairborn,
Greene County, Ohio.

Said real estate shall be divided upon the

following terms and conditions:
1. The property shall forthwith be listed for sale
with a mutually agreeable broker and sold for a mutually
agreeable sale price; until said sale, the Wife shall
have the sole and exclusive possession of said premises;
2. Until sale, the Husband shall pay, and save
the Wife harmless, as to payments due 6n the mortgage;
3. After sale, the net proceeds of the sale shall
be divided equally between the Husband and the Wife.
B) Household Goods, Furniture and Furinshings:
The Wife shall retain, free and clear of any claim of the
Husband, all right, title and interest in all of the household
goods, the following items which shall be retained by the Husband:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

II

Last Supper painting
Gold-green loveseat
Hide-a-bed couch
Coffee table
One (1) end table
Two (2) lamps
Kitchen table
Six (6) kitchen chairs

SCHLAFMAN AND FODAL.
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9. Beige file cabinet
10. Two (2) shelf units
11. Desk lamp
12. Ironing board
13. Iron
14. China
15. Roll Top Desk
C) Automobiles;
1.

The Husband shall transfer to the Wife title to and

ownership of the 1979 GMC Van;
2.

The Wife shall transfer to the Husband title to and

ownership of the 1974 Opal Manta automobile.
D) Bank Accounts:
The Husband and Wife shall dissolve all of their joint bank
accounts and mutually divide the monies therein.
E) Mutual Funds:
The Husband and Wife shall divide equally their holdings in
the Fidelity Destiny Mutual Fund account.
F) Life Insurance Policies:
The Husband agrees to irrevocably designate each of the
minor children as beneficiary on his existing life insurance
policies for the sum of at least $15,000.00 for each child; this
obligation shall terminate as to each respective child when the
Husband's obligation to pay child support also terminates.

The

Husband shall retain ownership of the existing policies.
ARTICLE 4. CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT
1. The Wife shall have the sole and exclusive custody, care
and control of the minor children; the Husband shall have the

SCHLAFMAN AND FODAL

right of reasonable visitation with reasonable

notice to be

provided to the Wife;
2) The Husband shall pay, as and for child support, the sum
of One Hundred Twenty Dollars ($120,00) per month per child? said
payments shall be paid on a bi-monthly basis and shall be paid
by military alottment;
3) The Husband shall also be responsible for payment of all
extraordinary medical, dental and optical expenses incurred oy
the minor chidren; all efforts shall be made to have the minor
children treated at a military installation if that is reasonable
and practicable.
ARTICLE 5-

DEBTS AND EXPENSES

A) The Husband shall pay, and save the Wife harmless, as
to payment of the following debts:
1. Master Card
2. Elder Beerman
B) Neither the Husband nor the Wife shall incur credit in
the name of the other after execution of this Agreement*
ARTICLE 6 COMPLETE SETTLEMENT
This Agreement shall be a full and complete settlement of
all alimony and property rights between the parties, each of whom
does by the provisions hereof, release, satisfy and discharge all
claims and demands against the other, inculding rights of dower/
inheritance, descent and distribution, allowance for year's
support, exemption from administration, all rights as surviving

SCHLAFMAN AND FODAL

spouse, heir, legatee, and next of kin in the estate of the other,
and all rights to administer the estate of the other, and in all
property which each now or may hereafter acquire, except as hereid
provided.
ARTICLE 7. INCORPORATION INTO DECREE
This Agreement, or any amendment thereto, shall be submitted
to any Court in which a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, or
an action between the parties for Divorce may be pending and, if
found by the Court to be fair and equitable and approved or
validated by the Court, shall be incorporated into the final
decree of said Court as the order of said Court.
ARTICLE 8. IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENT
Upon the execution of this Agreement, each party shall
deliver to the other party, or permit the other party to take
possession of all items of property to which each is entitled
under the terms of this Agreement and all periodic payments
required under the term of this Agreement shall commence.
Within fifteen (15) days after journalization of a Decree
of Dissolution of Marriage of the parties, or of a Decree of
Divorce between the partiesr incorporating this Agreement or any
amendment or modification thereof, each party shall execute and
deliver all deeds, conveyances, titles, certificates and other
documents or instruments necessary and proper to effectuate all
the terms of this Agreement.

J

Upon failure of either party to execute and deliver any such
deed, conveyance, title, certificate or other document or instrument to the other party, this Agreement shall constitute and
operate as such properly executed document and the County Auditor
and County Recorder and any and all other public and private
officials are hereby authorized and directed to accept this
Agreement or a properly certified copy thereof in lieu of the
document regularly required for such conveyance or transfer.
f1 . /?// .

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
is^ouT—'

A/La

/i^n^

frSra*^

/'O

Husband
(!) William P. Tross, Hus

}ftr>j j * ^

as3 ta
to (1)
U)
tO (2)
12)
as3 to

^j T ^

(2) Mary <TT Tross, Wife

as to U )
STATE OP OHIO, GREENE COUNTY)ss
Before me, a notary public in and for said county and state,
personally appeared the above-named William P. Tross, Husband,
known to me to be one of the parties described in and who execute
the foregoing instrument and acknowledged that he executed the
same of his own free act and deed, for the uses and purposes
therein mentioned.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name and
affixed my official seal at Fairborn, Ohio, this 10th

day of

October, 1984.
Notary Public
. . 3, 1037
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STATE OF OHIO, GREENE COUNTY)ss
Before me, a notary public in and for said county and stater
personally appeared the above-named Mary C, Tross, Wife, known to
me to be one of the parties described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and acknowledged that she executed the same
of her own free act and deed, for the uses and purposes therein
mentioned.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name and
affixed my official seal at Fairborn, Ohio, this 10th

day of

October, 1984.

)AAA

UKLrU\*/^
Notary Public

My Comnu-iMuM L. .| .. - 'ui.c i ., i ^ w

' r~+* A vi

skin

cr\r\/s.\
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THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into at Fairbornf Ohio,
by and between William P. Tross and Mary C. Tross, hereinafter
called Husband and Wife, respectively, WITSTESSHTM:
WHEREAS, the Husband and Wife on or about October 10, 1984,
entered into a Separation Agreement, settling all of their rights
as to property division, alimony custody and child support?
WHEREAS, the Husband and Wife, now desire to modify and
supplement said Separation Agreement;
Brow, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants
and promises of the parties, the Husband and the Wife agree as
follows:
A)

ARTICLE 4.

CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT, Paragraph 1,

shall be modified to read as follows:
1.

The Wife shall have the sole and exclusive custody, care

and control of the minor children; the Husband and the Wife shall
cooperate fully between themselves in discussing all decisions
which may affect the general welfare and well being of the minor
children; the Wife shall, at all times, keep in contact with the
Husband to discuss with him fully and completely any decisions
which must be made concerning these matters; the Husband shall
have visitation rights as follows:
a)

In the event that the minor children reside in

the City of Fairborn, the Husband shall have the right
of reasonable visitation with reasonable notice to be
SCHLAFMAN ANO FODAL
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provided t o t h e Wife; said v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s s h a l l
be a t l e a s t e q u i v a l e n t t o t h o s e defined i n t h e
Standard

Order

of V i s i t a t i o n ,

also

Court's

a c o p y of which

is

attached hereto;
b)

In t h e event t h a t the minor c h i l d r e n r e s i d e in

the State
December,

of

Utah,

which

is

contemplated

1 9 8 4 , t h e Husband s h a l l

have

after

visitation

rights:
1 ) For t h e p e r i o d each y e a r d u r i n g 'the
summer, nonschool months, commencing from one
(1 ) week a f t e r t h e end of e a c h s c h o o l y e a r
and c o n t i n u i n g t o t h e d a t e of one (1) week
b e f o r e t h e commencement of t h e new s c h o o l
y e a r ; c h i l d s u p p o r t s h a l l be a b a t e d f u l l y
d u r i n g s a i d p e r i o d ; t h e Husband s h a l l make
a l l t h e arrangements for t r a n s p o r t a t i o n to
and from the r e s i d e n c e of t h e Wife; the c o s t
of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n s h a l l be p a i d f u l l y by t h e
Husband u n l e s s t h e Wife i s e a r n i n g a t l e a s t
One Thousand D o l l a r s ($1 ,0 00 .00) or more p e r
month in g r o s s e a r n i n g s , w h e r e i n t h e Wife
s h a l l be o b l i g e d t o pay o n e - h a l f ( 1 / 2 ) of
s a i d e x p e n s e s f o r s a i d y e a r ; t h e Wife may
choose t o f o r t h w i t h pay h e r s h a r e t o t h e
Husband, o r , may c h o o s e to c r e d i t s a i d sum
toward t h e Husband's o b l i g a t i o n t o pay f u t u r e
child support;
2) For t h e p e r i o d each y e a r d u r i n g t h e
Christmas nonschool v a c a t i o n p e r i o d from 1:00
o ' c l o c k p . m . on C h r i s t m a s day c o n t i n u i n g
u n t i l 9:00 o ' c l o c k p.m. on December 3 1 .
3)
At any and a l l r e a s o n a b l e times i n
which t h e Husband may be in t h e a r e a where
the minor c h i l d r e n r e s i d e ;
4) At any and a l l o t h e r t i m e s a g r e e d
b e t w e e n t h e Husband and t h e W i f e .
B)

ARTICLE 4 .

to

CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT, s h a l l be m o d i f i e d
SCHLAFMAN AND FODAL
CO., L.P.A.

to include the following paragraph:
4)

Concerning tax exemptions, the Husband shall be entitled

to claim all of the minor children on his federal, state and city
income tax returns for the calendar year 1984.

For the calendar

years 1985, and thereafter, the rules promulgated by the Internal
Revenue Service shall apply in making such determination(s).
In all other respects, the Husband and the Wife ratify and
affirm the other provisions set forth in said

Separation

Agreement.
HB WITNESS WHEREOF, the Husband and the Wife have hereunto
executed this Supplemental Agreement this / / ^

day of November,

1984.

Villi am P. Tross

Mary C. T^s's
STATE OF OHIO, GREENE COUNTY)
William P. T r o s s
according
foregoing
his/her

to law,

ss.

a n d Mary C. T r o s s ,

deposes

and

states

Supplemental Agreement,

own v o l u n t a r y

a c t and

that

and t h a t

each

being

he/she

has

duly
read

the signing hereof

deed.

Ou ^^du^,

Nota2^

e?r-t_ii A c u ft M

AMn

Public

m n « i

sworn
the
is

u

c
%
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FREDERICK A. JACKMAN
Attorney for Defendant
1327 §outh 800 East, Suite 300
n
rem, UT 84058
Phone:
225-1632
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARY C. BARTLETT,
ANSWER & COUNTERCLAIM
Plaintiff,
Civil No. CV 86 3101

vs .
WILLIAM P. TROSS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW defendant by and through his attorney,
Frederick A. Jackman and answers plaintiff T s Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
The Complaint fails to state a claim against this defendant
upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
The defendant responds to the numbered paragraphs of
plaintiff's Complaint as follows:
1.

Admit;

2.

Admit;

3.

Admit;

4.

Admit;

5.

Admit;

6.

Admit;

7.

Admit;

8.

Admit;

9.

Deny;

10.

Deny;

11 .

Deny;

12.

Deny;

13.

Admit the Supplemental Agreement contains the provision

that the defendant shall be contacted in all matters regarding the
children but deny each and every allegation contained in this
paragraph.
14.

Deny;

16.

(sic)

17.

Deny;

18.

Deny;

19.

Admit;

20.

Admit the defendant has leased or rented the said real

Admit;

property but deny each and every other allegation contained in this
paragraph;
21 .

Deny;

22 .

Deny;

WHEREFORE, defendant prays that plaintiff's Complaint be
dismissed, that she take nothing thereby and defendant be awarded
the relief prayed for in his Counterclaim herein.
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COUNTERCLAIM
By way of Counterclaim the defendant alleges as follows:
1.

Defendant incorporates by reference paragraphs 1

through 6 of the plaintiff f s Complaint herein as if fully set
forth herein,
2.

That Article 3 paragraph A 2 of the Separation Agree

ment should be amended to read as follows:
That upon remarriage of the wife, and upon her vacation
of the real property, that the property be rented and that any
rent collected be applied toward the mortgage payment.

Should

the rent be insufficient to cover the mortgage payment then any
short-fall shall be split equally between the parties.
3.

That Article 3 paragraph A 3 should be modified to

read as follows:
After sale, the net proceeds of the sale shall be divide
equally between the husband and the wife, should there be a deficiency between the amount of the mortgage and the net proceeds of
the sale then such deficiency shall be paid equally by the parties
4.

That paragraph A 1 B 2 of the Supplemental Agreement

should be modified to read as follows:
That the parties shall alternate the period each year
during the Christmas non-school vacation from 5:00 p.m., on the
day the Christmas non-school vacation begins until 9:00 p.m. on
the day before the Christmas non-school vacation ends beginning
with the husband having custody of the children during the
Christmas Vacation for 1987.
-3-

5«

That a new paragraph be inserted as a new sub-paragr

c to paragraph 1 of Article 4 to read as follows:
That the husband, William P. Tross, shall be entitled to
perfrom all of the Church Ordinances having to do with the childre
as provided by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
including but not limited to the Baptism of each child, the
Confirmation of each child, the Ordination to the Priesthood of ea
child, and any and all other ecclesiastical ordinances.
6.

That a new cub-paragraph be inserted and number as

sub-paragraph d of Article 4 paragraph 1 to read as follows:
That in the event that the wife, Mary C. Tross, should
remarry, then her new husband shall be restrained from interfering
with the visitation of the husband, William P. Tross, or with his
relationship with his children.

In this regard the new husband

shall be specifically restrained from criticizing the natural
father of the children, participating in the Church Ordinances
concerning the children where the natural father is entitled to
officiate, and from contacting or harassing the natural father
in and on behalf of his wife or the children.

It is the intent of

this provision to provide that discussions about the children and
the relationship of the natural parents of the children to the
children be handled between the parents without the interference
of third parties.
7.

That Article 4 paragiaph 3 be amended to read as

follows:
That it is reasonable that both parties maintain

medical hospitalization/dental insurance on the minor children of
the parties and that they otherwise split equally any amounts not
covered by insurance*

And it is further reasonable that all efforts

shall be made to have the minor children treated at a military
installation if that is reasonable and practicable,
8.

That it is reasonable that the Separation Agreement

and Supplemental Agreement be modified to provide that defendant
have the minor children of the parties for the purposes of income
tax deduction/exemption.
9.

That it is reasonable that the Separation Agreement

and Supplemental Agreement be modified to provide that plaintiff
not be allowed to record telephone conversations with the defendant
or with the defendant and the children for any reason.
10.

That it is reasonable that the Separation Agreement

and Supplemental Agreement be modified to provide the definition
of "Reasonable Notice".
11.

Defendant has been required to retain an attorney

to defendant himself against the allegations of the plaintiff in her
Complaint which are without foundation and not brought in good
faith thereby entitling defendant to attorney's fees, and further
defendant is entitled to his costs and attorney's fees in bringing this Counterclaim.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays judgment against the defendant
as follows:
1.

For relief consistent with the foregoing allegations;

2.

For attorney's fees and costs incurred herein;
-5-

3.

For such other and further relief as this Court

deems just.
DATED

, 1987.

Attorney for Defendant
MAILED A TRUE & CORRECT copy of the foregoing to
JAY FITT
Attorney for Plaintiff
1327 South 800 East, Suite 100
Orem, UT 84058
postage prepaid, this

\ \n

day of January, 1987.

\)_\e^—

-6-
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Attorney for Plaintiff
1325 South 800 East, Suite 100
Crem, Utah 84058
(801) 225-5550
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—OOOOOOO—

MARY C. BARTLETT,

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS
TO THE RECOMMENDATION
OF THE COMMISSIONER

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM P. TROSS,
Defencant.

Civil No. C V - % k - ^ t > \
—oooOooo—

Comes now

tne plaintiff,

tne recommendation
contained in

of

the

nary C. Bartlett,

Domestic

the supplemental

Relations

and cojects to
Commissioner as

order prepared by counsel for the

defendant in the following particulars to wit:
1.

The plaintiff

paragraph 2.

The defendant

obtain a sale on

that

lose if

Further, the

any is

set forth in

he

has

refused

to

keep the

he snould bear the entire responsibility
sustained in

the sale

of the property.

plaintiff is entitled to the use of tnat house, and

is entitled to the
for tne

the provisions

nas been responsible for failing to

property,

and

plaintiff informed,
of tne

objects to

rents there

defendant to

make the

from.

The

provisions providing

mortgage payments, regarcles3 cf

paragraph 4.
virtually

That provision, as it is presently contained, would

give

tne

plaintiff

no

children curing the Christmas
ner an

opportunity to

vacation.

for

their visitation perioc.

be with the

would neitner allow

tneir

return

to

scnool following

Furtner tne defendant exercised, during

tne year 1986, tne majority

of

tne

the children.

tiff be allowed to

It

to

help tnem prepare for visitation with the

defendant or to prepare

visitation witn

opportunity

enjoy tne

Christmas

vacation

as his

It is reasonable tnat tne plainChristmas holiday,

1987, with tne

children.
3.

The

paragrapn 5
violation of
court nor

plaintiff
in

that

objects

the

order

the separation

any other

to tne provisions contained in
is

of church

court has

un-enfcrceable,
anc State.

tne authority

and

is a

Neither this

to maKe judgments

regarding how churches shall conduct tneir business.
4.

The

plaintiff

objects

to the provisions contained in

paragraph 7 in that she is unemployed and unable, on

her own, to

obtain any kind of medical insurance for tne children.

There nas

been no change in circumstance which would alter

tne requirement

of tne

hospitalization

defencant to

make all

expenditures for

and cental care.
5.
paragrapn

Tne plaintiff objects to
d

in

llowarc Bartlett,

tnat

she,

pays over

tne

provisions

contained in

witn tne assistance of ner nusbanc,
57-' of

tne total

cost and expenses

necessary for tne support of tne defendant's miner cnilcren.

7.

The plaintiff onjects cc

paragraph 11

in that

the second

the

provisions

contained in

sentence therein refers to two

week visitations, and it was tne understanding of the plaintiff's
counsel,
periods of

that

the

defendant

visitation upon

would

two weeks

have

three

notice, one

of aGcitional
of wnicn tne

plaintiff could refuse if she nad other plans.
Respectfully submitted this

/U

day of July, 1987

xiJaW F111

Attorney for Plaintiff

O r\ 1

L'

:.!: ^ 0*

1 i. ±

Attcr.ney for Plaintiff
1325 Soutn 800 East, Suite 100
Oreik,
(301)

U t a h 8 40 58
225-5550

IH THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IK AMD FOR UTAH CCUKTY, STATE OF UTAH
—cccOcoo—
MARY C.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILIMG

RARTLETT,
Plaintiff,

vs .
•WILLIAM P .

TROSS,

:ivn M.Q))'86>i3/o/

Defendant.
—oocOoco—
Comes new

Jay Fitt,

ano certifies tnat a true ana accurate

copy of the plaintiff's objections to the ccniiwissicner s recommenced order

were mailed to tne attorney for tne defendant, to wit,

Frecerick A. Jackman, Esq., at

1327 SOU

Utah 84058, on tne 13th day of July, U'37.
Datec this 13th day of July, 19b7\.

East, Suite

300, Ore-,

FILED
FOURTH JUDICIAL 9STOCT COURT
Of- UWH UQUSTY STATE OF UTAJ*

.OffUTT

FREDERICK A. JACKMAN
Attorney for Defendant
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 225-1632
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARY C. BARTLETT,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM P. TROSS,
Civil No. CV 86 3101
Defendant.

A Pre-trial Settlement Hearing was held on the 29th

day

of

June, 1987, pursuant to notice given on the 19th day of February,
1987,

the Honorable Commissioner Howard H. Maetani presiding. The

plaintiff

appeared

by

and through her attorney, Jay Fitt.

The

defendant appeared in person and was represented by his attorney,
Frederick

A.

Jackman.

The

testimony

through counsel and the Court having heard argument of

counsel, having reviewed the

parties

file

in

having

this

proffered

matter,

and

their

being

otherwise fully advised in the premises, now, therefore, upon the
-1-

recommendation

of

the

Honorable

Court

Commissioner, which

recommendation was accepted by the parties, by and through
attorneys,

and

for

good

their

appearing, the following Supplemental

Order is hereby issued.
1.
the

That the Decree of Dissolution entered in this

Common

Pleas

Court

of

Green

County,

Ohio,

October,

10th

day

1984, and the Supplemental Agreement dated the 11th

day of November, 1984, are hereby made a part of
are

in

Division of

Domestic Relations; the Separation Agreement dated the
of

case

entitled

to

full

faith

and

this

file

and

credit under the laws of the

United States and the State of Utah.
2.
the

That this Supplemental Order shall amend and

provisions

of

the

Supplemental Agreement.
Order

contradict

any

Decree,

the

To the extent
of

the

terms

Separation Agreement, and
the

provisions

govern.

contradict the

of

this

of the Decree, Separation

Agreement, or Supplemental Order, then the terms
shall

supplement

of

this

Order

To the extent that the terms of this Order do not
Decree,

Separation

Agreement,

Agreement, then those terms are hereby affirmed.

-2-

or

Supplemental

3.
sale.

That

the

real

property

located in Ohio be listed for

The defendant shall be responsible for the payment of

the

mortgage on the property and in the event the property is rented,
the

rent

shall

be

first applied to the mortgage payment.

deficiency shall be born soley by the defendant.
net proceeds of the sale shall be
parties

and

the mortgage

should
and

divided

Any

After sale, the

equally

between

the

there be a deficiency between the amount of

the

net

proceeds

of

the

sale,

then

such

deficiency shall be paid equally by the parties.
4.

That

the

parties

shall alternate the period each year

during the childrenTs Christmas Vacation from 5:00
day

the

Christmas

vacation

begins until 9:00 p.m.

before the Christmas vacation ends
having

p.m.

beginning

with

on

the

on the day
the

husband

custody of the children during the Christmas vacation for

1987.
5. That William P. Tross shall be entitled to perform all of
the church ordinances having to do with the children as
by

the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints including but

not limited to the baptism of each
each

provided

child,

child,

the

confirmation

of

the ordination of the priesthood of each child, and
-3-

any and all other ecclesiastical ordinances.
6,

That

both

parties are restrained from interfering from

the visitation of the other

party

relationship with the children.
to

take

all

spouses, from
preventing

or

from

the

party's

Both parties are further ordered

steps necessary to restrain third parties, such as
criticizing

the

parents

of

the

children,

and

them from contacting or harassing the other parent in

and on behalf of the other parent or children.
of

other

It is the

intent

this Order to provide that discussions about the children and

the relationship of the natural parents of the
children

children

to

the

be handled between the parents without the interference

of third parties.
7.

It is reasonable that

hospitalization/dental

both

insurance

parties

on

parties if said insurance is reasonably
that

they

insurance.
to

otherwise

split

equally

the

maintain

medical,

minor children of the

available

to

them

and

any amounts not covered by

It is further ordered that all efforts shall be

made

have the minor children treated at a military installation to

take advantage of the natural father's military
all possible.
-4-

benefits

if

at

8.
of

the

It is ordered that the defendant have the minor children
parties

for

the

purpose

of

income tax deductions or

exemptions.
9.

It

is

conversations

ordered

that

neither

party

record

telephone

with the party or with the children of the parties

for any reason.
10.
is

With regard to child support, so long as the

paying

defendant

the child support through his military alotment, then

he shall determine the total amount of child support due for
year,

the

divide

that number by 12, and that shall be the amount of

the alotment.

The defendant shall not cancel the alotment during

the summer visitation during which time the child
normally

abate

but

support

would

shall pay the reduced alotment on a monthly

basis.
11.

It is ordered that the defendant

visitation

with

the

children

each

other

to

have

additional

not more than three times during

each calendar year by giving the plaintiff
notice of his intent to visit.

may

at

least

two

weeks

Both parties shall cooperate with

facilitate this visitation and during one of the

-twi> week visitations the defendant shall have the absolute
-5-

right

to visit.
12.
attorney's

Both parties are hereby ordered to submit affidavits on
fees within ten days for further consideration by the

Court.
DATED this

&(? day of J ^ ^ 1 9 8 7

RECOMMENDED BY:

)MESTIC COURT COMMISSIONER

'BY: ^
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

-6-

from 10:00 a.m. on the day after Christmas vacation begins until
9:00 p.m. on the day preceding the day that Christmas vacation
ends.
4.
notified

of

As it relates to paragraph 5, defendant shall be
important

events

in

the

lives

of

the

parties

children, and defendant shall have preference over anyone else to
perform church ordinances since he is the natural father, unless
it is contrary to religious policy of the church.
5.

As it relates to paragraph 8 of the supplemental

order, defendant shall have the minor children of the parties for
the purpose of income tax deductions or exemptions as long as
defendant

is responsible

for the mortgage payment on the Ohio

home as set out in paragraph 3, and defendant is current on his
child support obligation for the year in question.
6.

As it relates to paragraph 11, defendant may have

additional visitation with the children on not more than three
occasions during each calendar year by giving the plaintiff at
least two (2) weeks notice of his intent to visit.

Both parties

shall cooperate with each other to facilitate this visitation and
plaintiff shall have the right to deny visitation on one occasion
each

year

if

plaintiff

has

made

prior

arrangements

for

the

children, or the visitation is inconvenient.
7.

All other paragraphs in defendant's

supplemental

order which were not objected to shall be included in the order.
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JAY FITT
Attorney for Plaintiff
1325 South 800 East, Suite 100
Orem, Utah 84058
(801) 225-5550
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—0000000—

MARY C. BARTLETT,

OBJECTION TO
RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM P. TROSS,
Defendant.

Civil No.
—oooOooo—

Comes now

the plaintiff,

the recommendation
contained in

of

the

Mary C. Bartlett,

Domestic

Relations

of

the

Commissioner as

his recommendation dated the 22nd day of September,

1987, for the reasons stated in her objection
tion

and objects to

Commissioner

to the recommenda-

as contained in the supplement order

prepared by the counsel for the defendant which

was submitted to

the court in July, 1987.
The plaintiff

requests that a hearing be set before a judge

of the Fourth Judicial District
heard in its entirety.

Court

that

tne

matter

may be

Respectfully submitted th IS

^

\ G ay of September, 1987

Jay-fitt
Attorney for "Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby

certify that a true and accurate copy of the above

and foregoing was sent postage prepaid this
September, 1987, to:
Frederick A, Jackman, Esq.
Attorney at Law
1327 South 800 East
Orem, Utah 84058

^

\ day of

0

rn 2- Si

In the Fourth Judicial Districted ' ^
of the State of Utah
In and For Utah County
MINUTE ENTRY
MARY C . BARRETT

PWnttff
CASE NUMBER
DATED

WILLIAM P . TROSS

Defendant

1

CV 8 6 3 1 0 1

October

6 , 1987

BOYD L . P A R K

JUDGE

NOTICE OF HEARING
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that this matter will come

before

the Court for hearing on the Objections to the Recommendation of the
Domestic Relations Commissioner on November 16, 1987 at 1:30 p.m.
This is a second setting, only.
Dated this 6th day of October, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

•-"".'•..••

.

-

. .

,•---~y

BOYD L. PARK, OUDGE
I certify that I mailed true copies of the foregoing

postage

pre-paid, on the 6th day of October, 1987 to the following:
Oay Fitt, 1325 S. 800 E. # 1 0 0 , Orem, UT 84058
Frederick A. dackman, 1327 S. 800 E., Orem, UT 84058
WILLIAM F. HUISH, CLERK

BY^C^Z u^CZ^t^p^z^l^i

CV Ui~ : -

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY

MARY C. BARTLETT,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NUMBER:

CV 86 3101

-vs-

DATE:

WILLIAM P. TROSS,

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

Defendant.

November 16, 1987

Rptd. Richard C. Tatton, CSR

HEARING ON OBJECTION TO DRC RECOMMENDATION
This matter came before the Court on plaintiff's
objection to the Domestric Relations Commissioner's
Recommendation. Plaintiff was present with counsel, Jay Fitt.
Defendant was present with counsel, Frederick A. Jackman.
The Court met with counsel in chambers and will not
require opening statements.
Mary C. Bartlett was sworn and testified in her own
behalf on direct by Mr. Fitt.
Counsel and the Court reviewed the Supplemental Order
entered August 6, 1987, of which, was addressed in the
recommendation of the DRC.
The Court ordered that paragraph no. 9 of the
Supplemental Order remain the same. In said order, the Court
ordered that paragraph no. 11 remain the same and in an effort to
help in scheduling visitation, that the plaintiff also advise the
defendant in advance regarding the major plans of her family.
The Court will allow a mutual restraining order to enter.

WC\c,7

Cr%

m

1

"

21

3

*

i. i' -

5/

••^il^:..

4 TERRI C, BINGHAM - 4540
WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI

5 Attorneys for Plaintiff
2696 N, University Ave.

6 Suite 220
Provo, UT

7 Telephone:

84604
(801) 375-5600

8

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,

9

STATE OF UTAH

io|
11

MARY C. BARTLETT,
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Plaintiff,

121

vs.

13
14

WILLIAM R. TROSS,

15
16

Civil No. CV-86-3101
Commissioner Maetani

Defendant.
COMES

NOW

the

Plaintiff,

17 through her attorney, Terri

C.

Mary

Bingham

C.
of

Bartlett by and

Watson,

Seiler &

18 Orehoski and moves the above-entitled Court to reopen the above19 entitled case for the reason and basis that follows:

20|

1.

That the

verdict or

decision as

rendered by the

21 Court is against the law, or in the alternative, is in error in

221 law.
23

2.

That there was material evidence not introduced at

24 trial, as a result of inadequate representation by Plaintiff's
25 attorney and it is in the interest of justice that the Court
26 should hear said evidence.

27!
281

1

21

3
3.

This

motion

is

supported

by the accompanying

4
Affidavit and Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial.

5
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays she be granted

6
7
8
9
10

12||

131'
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

and that

she be

a new trial

awarded her court costs and attorney's fees in

bringing this matter before the Court.
DATED this Q O day of December, 1987.
WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI

TERRI C. BINGHAM
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the

foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following

this J£_ day of December, 1987:
Fredrick Jackman
1327 South 800 East
Suite 300
Orem, UT 84058

SECRETARY

•- !L F ~.

1

easjtt-7

21

*:l ;./.M r U:';c:

31
41
5
6
7
8

fflssi
-i f ••>;

TERRI C. BINGHAM - 4540
WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2696 N. University Ave.
Suite 220
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (301) 375-5600

9

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,

101

STATE OF UTAH

11

121
13
14
15

MARY C. BARTLETT,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM R. TROSS,

Civil No. CV-86-3101
Commissioner Maetani

.Defendant.

16
17

COMES

NOW

18

through her attorney,

19

Orehoski and

the

Plaintiff,

Terri

C.

Mary

Bingham

C. Bartlett, by and
of

Watson,

Seiler &

submits the following Memorandum in support of her

201 Motion for New Trial in compliance

with

Rule

59

of

the Utah

211 Rules of Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT

22
23
24

I.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL
ON THE BASIS THAT THE COURT'S DECISION
REGARDING FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS
IS AGAINST THE LAW OR IN ERROR OF LAW.

25
On Novemebr

16, 1987,

Judge Boyd

Park of the Fourth

26
Judicial District Court of Utah

27
28

County,

State

of

Utah, heard

1

21
3
4 I arguments

from
the

both

parties

parties

regarding

the unresolved issues

5

between

g

Defendant's

7

alleged that he should be entitled

g

for federal and state income tax purposes for the minor children

9

of the parties.

pleadings

in

the

above-entitled

and

the

subsequent hearings. Defendant
to the

In

dependents exemption

Counsel for the Defendant argued in Defendant's

20

Response to

22

Commissioner that the Decree of Divorce

22

to the

23

determine in the

24

should be distributed.

25

to

2g

Commissioner.)

27

16f 1987

Trial

2g

spouse to

the support

29

determining

20

exemptions.

21

the allocation of income

22

matter.

Plaintiff's Objection

to the recommendation of the
came into

affect prior

1985-1986 Tax Reform Act and therefore the parties could

Plaintiff's

pleadings

where

to

In addition,

who

income

tax allocations

(See paragraph 6 of Defendant's Response

Objection

that

the

the

Recommendation

Defendant argued
contributions

of the

should

the

receive

Said representations

the

the

at the November

made

children could

of

by Plaintiff's
not be

federal

used in

income

tax

of the federal law regarding

tax deductions

for minor

children of

divorced parents is in error.
11

23

The Supplemental Agreement heretofore executed between

24

the parties on

25
26

states in paragraph 4:
"Concerning tax exemptions, the husband shall
be entitled to claim all of the minor children on
his federal, state and city income tax returns for
the calendar year 1984.
For the calendar years

27
28

the

14th

day

of

November,

1984 specifically

1

2j|
3
4
5

1985f and thereafter, the rules promulgated by the
Internal Revenue Service shall apply in making such
determination(s)."

g

Therefore, by

7

order of the Court, the

g

promulgation of rules regarding dependents exemptions as enacted

g

in the Internal Revenue Code,

JO

agreement of the parties and subsequent
parties

are

bound

by

the continuing

26 Internal Revenue Code Section 152(e)

jl

the custodial

12

if:

23

parent is

entitled to

provides that

the dependency exemptions

"(A) A child (as defined in Section 151(c)(3))
receives over half of his support during the calendar year from his parents - (1) who are divorced or
legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, (2) who are separated under a
written separation agreement, or (3) who live apart
at all times during the last 6 months of the calendar year, and
(B) Such child is in the custody of one or
both of his parents for more than one-half of the
calendar year, such child shall be treated for purposes of subsection (a) as receiving over half of
his support during the calendar year from the parent having custody for a greater portion of the
calendar year (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the "custodial parent").

24
25
26
27
23
29
20

21

Since

Plaintiff

is

custodial

parent

and

has

the

221
children with

her more than three-fourths (3/4) of the calendar

23
year, she

should

be

entitled

pursuant

to

agreement

of the

24
parties

and

the

Internal

Revenue

Code

to

the

dependency

25
exemption for the minor children of

the parties.

Defendant has

26
failed

to

show

that

there

would

be

any material change of

27
circumstances

justifying

the

28
3

Court

to

reopen

the

issue of

1
2|
3
4 I dependency exemption
5

of the parties,

g
7

In

10

13
14

Wherefore, even

17

Internal

Revenue

if there

Code

Section

were a proper basis for the

Court to reopen the issue of dependency exemptions
of federal

income taxes,

minor children of the parties of this
Rule 59 of
for the granting

the Utah

of

a

for purposes

the Court should consider the support

contributions made in behalf of Plaintiff's

15
16

26

"For purposes
of this
subsection, in the
case of the remarriage
of a parent, support of
a child received from the parent's spouse shall
be treated as received from the parent."

gll

12

addition,

152(e)(5) specifically states:

g

11

subsequent to the November, 1984 agreement

new

for the

lawsuit.

Rules of
trial

new spouse

on

Civil Procedure allows
specific

grounds which

include:

181,

20iI

"(a)(6)
Insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict or other decision, or that
it is against law,
(7)
Error in law."

21

Plaintiff

29JI

contends

that

it

would

22

interest of justice to reopen this matter for

23

issues

existing

between

24 I interpretation of law,
25
26|
27
281

the

parties

be

in

the best

resolution of the

pursuant

to

correct

II. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL
IN THAT THERE WAS MATERIAL EVIDENCE NOT
INTRODUCED AT TRIAL, INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION BY PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY, AND IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE COURT SHOULD HEAR
SAID EVIDENCE.
Pursuant
Procedure, the
of

a

to

Court

parties'

Rule

the

Utah

Rules

of Civil

may grant a new trial based on negligence

counsel

Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d
On November
parties

parties.

of

under

"exigent

or

exceptional

which appear to have resulted in an injustice.1*

circumstances

both

59

912 (Utah, 1982).

16, 1987,

regarding

There was

the

the Court heard arguments from

unresolved

issues

between

the

material evidence which was not introduced

at trial.
In

regard

introduced at
of

being

summer

trial regarding

uprooted

friends in

to

for

Utah and

visitation,

no

evidence

was

the affect on the minor children

three

months

being sent

from

their

family and

to California where they spend

the entire summer with a babysitter or in a day camp while their
father is at work.
In

regard

to

religious

ordinances, no evidence was

introduced at trial regarding the affect
of

having

perform
addition,

the

Court

religious
no

instead

ordinances

evidence

was

on the

minor children

of the child determine who will
on

behalf

introduced

of

the

child.

at trial regarding the

policy of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
5

In

as it

1

21
3
4 I relates
5

to

the

child's

freedom

of

choice

versus the court

mandate that the father will perform the religious ordinances.

6

In regard to

Christmas

visitation,

no

7

introduced at

3

extended vacation which concludes approximately 11

g

the children are required to attend school again.

10

evidence was

trial regarding the affect on the children of the
hours before

In regard to medical and dental insurance, no evidence

H

was introduced regarding Champus coverage or the hardship on the

12

Plaintiff of

13

at Hill Air Force

14

commuting over 160 miles to obtain health coverage

With

Base,

regard

to

Plaintiff

was

federal

present

dependency

exemptions,

16

evidence regarding the amount of support

17

by her

18

interpretation of the federal income tax laws would have allowed

19

Plaintiff a

20

income tax exemptions awarded to her.

21

to

tax

15

present spouse.

unable

income

given to

the children

That evidence, coupled with the correct

high probability

of success

in having the federal

The exclusion of said evidence from the trial

22

matter has

23

minor children of the parties.

24

resulted

WHEREFORE, the
Court

grant

a

in this

in injustice to both the Plaintiff and the

new

Plaintiff

the

26

evidence may be

27

resolution of the issues between the parties.

presented

trial

respectfully

25

28

the Court with

for

wherein
a

all

proper,

requests that

relevant law and

equitable

and just

1

21

3

1

4
5

DATED this ^frfday of December, 1987.
WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI

6

1

7.

TJIM^
TERRI C .

3II

9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

OBWW>4

BINGHAM

A t t o r n e y for

Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the

foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following

this ,>ffictay of December, 1987:
Fredrick Jackman
1327 South 800 East
Suite 300
Orem, UT 84058

/OAArLud
SECRETARY

^^^jj^Scfl-^

P "!i L E: D
iliiRIH. u;.iii: -: "s<
J' L'T'.h LS' • - \ \

1

r •*?»:.• T

21

ISS3JAN -7 iM 3 51

3

A.Li.

4

1
6
1
5

7

TERRI C. BINGHAM - 4540
WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2696 N. University Ave,
Suite 220
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-5600

81

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,

9

STATE OF UTAH

101

MARY C. BARTLETT,

n
12
13

AFFIDAVIT OF
MARY C. BARTLETT

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM R. TROSS,

14

Civil No. CV-86-3101
Commissioner Maetani

Defendant.

15
COMES

16

NOW

the

Affiant,

Mary C. Bartlett, and after

17

having first been duly sworn upon her oath

18

as follows:
1.

19
20

22

evidence

23

matter.

25
26
27
28

I

am

and say

the Plaintiff in the above-entitled

matter.

21

24

That

does depose

2.

On November

was

presented

3.

16,
by

1987,

a

trial

was

held where

both parties in the above-entitled

That your Affiant does

not believe

that material

evidence was introduced to the Court by her attorney.
4.

That in

regard to Summer visitation, no evidence

1
21

3
4
5
6
7

was introduced
children

of

trial

being

they spent

regarding

uprooted

family and friends in

for

Utah and

the entire

the

affect

three

on

the minor

(3) months from their

being sent

to California where

summer with a babysitter or in a daycamp

while their father is at work.

81
9

at

5.
the affect

That no evidence was introduced at trial regarding

on the minor children of having the Court instead of

101 the child decide who will perform religious ordinances
11 behalf.
121

6.

on their

In regard to religious ordinances, no evidence was

13

introduced at trial regarding the policy of the

14

Christ of Latter-day Saints as it relates to the child's freedom

15

of choice.versus the Court mandate that the . father will perform

16

the religious ordinances.

17

7.

18

evidence

19

hardship on

was

That in regard to medical and dental insurance, no
introduced

23
24
25

261
27
28

8.

regarding

the Plaintiff

201 to obtain health care at
21 children.
221

A

Champus

allowing Defendant

Hill

Air

Supplemental

to claim

minor children of the
Thereafter,

coverage

or

the

of commuting approximately 160 miles
Force

Agreement

entered into by the parties on the 14th

1985.

Church of Jesus

the income

parties for
the

rules

Base

for

the minor

has

heretofore been

day of

November, 1984,

tax exemptions for the

the calendar

year 1984, and

"promulgated by the Internal

1
2
3

Revenue Service shall apply in making such determinations."

4
5
6
7
8

9.

That

your

Affiant

believes

she provides

approximately sixty-five percent (65%) of the support of each of
the minor children of the parties and should be entitled
dependency

exemption

for

the

purposes

of

to the

federal and state

income taxes.

9

10.

That your Affiant is currently earning no income;

10

however,

11

amounts to the support of the minor children

12j

this lawsuit.

13

that

your

Affiant's

spouse

has

contributed
of the

significant
parties to

DATED this 26y~aay of December, 1987.

14

1511

/yyj.

/f /a
-+*£.
#%«, /V£,,^fe^-

•tg

MARY/CC

BARTLETT

Affiant
17
18

SUBSCRIBED

and

SWORN

to

before

me t h i s . ^ y d a y of

December, 1987.

19

2111
22

23
24
25
26
27
28

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

&(i/«&

Residing At:

(jU^Jor^U

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the
this 3ft

foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following
day of December, 1987:
Fredrick Jackman
1327 South 800 East
Suite 300
Orem, UT 84058

SECRETARY
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY

MARY C. BARTLETT,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER:

CV 86 3101

-vs-

DATE:

JUNE 29, 1988

WILLIAM P. TROSS,

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

Defendant.
RULING
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Motion
for New Trial submitted in accordance with Rule 2.8 of the Rules
of Practice of the District Courts. The Court has read
plaintiff's Motion, Memorandum in Support of Motion for New
Trial, Affidavit of the plaintiff and plaintiff's Reply to
defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Opposition to
Motion for New Trial. The Court has read defendant's Memorandum
of Points and Authorities In Opposition to Motion For New Trial,
and being fully advised in the premises makes the following
Ruling:
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial is denied.
Dated a t P r o v o , Utah thi$~-2r9^pt^day

of J u n g ,

1988

JOYS'L. PARlO, DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:

T e r r i C. Bingham, E s q .
F r e d e r i c k A. Jackman, Esq.

J»ynr

TERRI C. BINGHAM - 4540
WATSON & SEILER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2696 N. University Ave.
Suite 22 0
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-5600

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

U

NOTICE OF APPEA:

MARY C. BARTLETT,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. CV86-3101
(Judge Boyd L. Park)

WILLIAM P. TROSS,
DefendantsCOMES NOW

the plaintiff, Mary C. Bartlett, by and through

her attorney of record,
and hereby

Terri C.

Bingham of

gives notice of her appeal to the Court of Appeals,

State of Utah, from a decision rendered by
in the

Watson & Seiler,

Fourth Judicial

District Court,

Utah, Case No. CV86-3101.

Said

Judge Boyd

L. Park

Utah County, State of

decision was

rendered on June

29, 1988 by Judge Park and was filed in the Office of the Clerk
thereof that same day.

Plaintiff

does hereby

appeal from the

whole of said decision.
DATED this a t ^ day of July, 1988.
!\

/
H r l ^ l ^ fo\r/^J*& Yy^

TERRI C. BINGHAM
O
Attorney for Plaintiff

naifULj-vf
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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MARY C. BARTLETT

! 1
rss

6
Plaintiff,
7
8

~ ^
vs

Civil No. CV-86-3101
HEARING TRANSCRIPT

9
WILLIAM P. TROSS
10

Defendant.
11
12
13

BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 16th day of

14

November 1987 the HEARING in the above^entitled matter was

15

taken by Richard C. Tatton a Certified Shorthand Reporter and

16

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah before the Honorable

17

Boyd L. Park at the Utah County Courthouse, Provo, Utah 8460H

18
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A P P E A R A N C E S

For the Plaintiff:

Mr. Jay Fitt
Attorney at Law
Orem, Utah

For the Defendant:

Mr. Rick Jackman
Attorney at Law
Orem, Utah

P R' 0 C E E D I N G S>

THE COURT:

This is the time set for the hearing

of Mary C. Bartlett vs. William P. Tross and this is a
domestic

relations matter here on appeal from Commissioner

Maetani's Court.Mr. Fitt
MR. FITT:
THE COURT:

Yes Your Honor.
Mr. Jackman are you ready?

MR. JACKMAN:
THE COURT:
proceed.

are you ready?

Yes sir.

Mr. Fitt it is your appeal you may

The record may show that the court has met with

counsel in chambers and it wonrt be necessary to give me
an opening statement I am oriented with the case already
by reason of our meeting.

Allright Mr. Fitt you may

2

proceed?
MR. FITT:
THE COURT:

We would call Mrs. Bartlett.
Mrs. Bartlett come forward and be

sworn and take the witness stand.
MARY C. BARTLETT
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff being
first duly sworn was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FITT:
Q

State your name and address for the record please?

A

Mary Christine Bartlett.

I live at

847 East

1400 South in Orem, Utah.
Q

And you petitioned you filed an action

in this

court to make an Ohio Judgment the judgment of this
court have you not?
A

Yes.

Q

Following a hearing before Commissioner Maetani a

proposed order was submitted and I reviewed that with
you do you recall that?
A

Yes.

Q

The first provision in that was the Decree of

Dissolution of the case in Green County, Ohio be made a
Decree of this court

you agree with that provision is

that correct?
A

Yes.

3

Q

That order includes a Decree and also a supplemental

order based upon supplemental agreements.
Now with regard to real property that exists
in the State of Ohio will you tell the court how that
property was acquired please?
A

We jointly bought the property to serve as residence

for us.

I do not remember the exact date of when we

purchased the property it was approximately a year and
a half two years before our divorce.
Q

Did you obtain , did you utilize any benefits that

you had under the administration to purchase it?
A

Yes I did.

available to him

Mr. Tross did not have enough benefits
because they were tied up in another

house down in Tuscon,Arizona

at the time and therefore

it was necessary to use my V.A. Benefits to buy the house.
Q

You had no obligation on that Tuscon house?

A

I don't believe my benefits were used there no.

Q

Were you signed on the dotted line with regard to

that house at all?
A

Jointly owned I believe.

Q

Do you know what has happened to that house?

A

I have no idea.

Q

Now at the time of the divorce were you occupying

that house?
A

In Fairborne?

Q

Yes.

A

Yes.

Q

And how soon after the divorce did you leave?

A

I ended up leaving approximately I think it was about

two and a half weeks after the divorce.

I originally

was going to be there for another six months but I got an
opportunity to come out to school early so I did.
Q

Did you tell Mr. Tross about your leaving?

A

Yes he knew.

Q

And did you leave him in charge of the house then?

A

He requested

proceedings

when we finished with the divorce

if he could be allowed to live in the house and

keep it up and put it on the market for sale so that he would nj^t
have to pay rent elsewhere and I agreed to it.
Q

Just a friendly aside agreement?

A

Just an aside agreement.

Q

Do you know whether it was put on the market?

A

The first indication that I had that it was actually

put on the market was

notification that I received from Mr.

Baldwin who was the realtor in charge and I think that was
around May of 1985.

It should have been put on the market

right away but that was the first indication that it actually
had been.
Q

Do you know what price was being asked for it at the

time?

D

A

It

seems like it was close to $79,000.00 and

I remember it being an extremely high price and I told
Bro. Baldwin or Mr. Baldwin

that I did not agree

to the price it was way to high

for the property in

the area and he informed me that is the price Mr. Tro.ss
had agreed to and signed to.
Q

Now you have attempted to contact other realtors

that Mr. Tross has used is that correct?
A

Yes when I found out who they were yes.

Q

Have you done anything to interfere with any sales

that might have been

proposed or pending?

A

No I have never been contacted by any pending sales.

Q

Did you refuse at anytime to approve a sale?

A

No I did not.

Q

To your understanding what was the mortgage

balance at the time what is it now

if you don't know what it)

was then?
A

I think it is in the neighborhood of $68,000.00

I donrt know the exact amount.
Q

You are not an expert as far as real property values

are or what the market might be so you don't know whether
or not even $68,000.00 would be a price that he had?
A

I don't know I have all I could go by is appraisals

done by various realtors.
Q

When did you first learn that Mr. Tross had stopped

6

1

making the payments on the house?

2 I

A

It was approximately three weeks ago.

I received

3

a telegram a mailgram in my mail box for me to contact a

4

number at the Veteran's Administration immediately.

5

went in the house and phoned the number and I was told

6

that at that time that the property would be foreclosed

7

in about a month which would have made it the end of

g

November of this year and that Mr. Tross was behind in hi

9

payments, four payments at that time,

10

Q

Now

are

y°u do you have any objection to signing

11

a deed in lieu of foreclosure

12

of the property and get rid of the obligation?

13
14

A

I

in order to get rid

To the best understanding that I have of what a

deed in lieu is no not at this time.

15

Q

You are not willing to do that?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

But if the deed in lieu is not acceptable then

18

you feel that Mr. Tross should be ordered

19

deficiencies that might come up?

to pay any

20

A

Yes I do.

21

Q

Now in paragraph four deals with visitation

22

that is Christmas visitation specifically it is your

23

position that that alternating Christmas vacation is

24

appropriate but would like to have the children picked up

25

by Mr.Tross on the day following the day that they are

1
2
3
4
5

released from school rather than that afternoon?
A

Yes that will give me time to get them packed

and things settled so that they can leave,
Q

You would also like to have them returned on the 31st

of December?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

And what are your reasons for that please?

8

A

One reason is that the school year varies as far

9

as vacation days form year to year.

There are some

10

years where they have to return to school the 2nd

11

of January . There is some years where it is a couple of da>f

12

later.

13

to need a couple of days to settle down

14

their routine before they get back into school.

15

I have found in the past that the children tend
and get back into

I have come to that conclusion partly by the their

16

behavior at home when they first return and also because

17

of various teachers calling me in for conferences soon

18

after the visitation time and informing me that the kids

19

were not ready to settle down and do work when they came

20

back.

21

Q

22

Other than those provisions you agree with Christmas

visitation?

23

A

Yes I have no problem with that.

24

Q

You would like to exercise your Christmas visitation

25

this year though because he had it last year?

A

Yes I would like to have them this year.

Q

Now with regard to summer visitation

the provisions

in the Ohio Decree are what you are willing to abide by
do you have some concerns about the children willing to
participate in organized activities like sports and I
have explained to you what the court's position is on that arj
that so you understand you will abide by that I guess?
A

I understand I may have to but I would like to comment}

that the only reason I agreed to that in the first place
is that Mr. Tross assured me in the presence of my attorney
that if the children decided that they wanted to participate
in summer sports during the month of June or other June
activities that he would not stand in their way and would
allow them to do so.

I took him at his word and agreed

to the summer visitation since then I have had at least one
child

every year desire to participate in summer sports and

each year they have been denied because Mr. Tross is not
willing to work with the children on that.
Q

But that as far

as you understand from the court's

position is going to be between him and them and you are
not to interfere

and you are willing to accept that then?

A

Yes.

Q

Paragraph 7 of the proposed order deals with medical

and dental and hospitalization insurance where are you
presently employed if you are?

9

A

I am not employed.

Q

What do you do?

A

I am a student finishing up my Bachelor's

Degree at Brigham Young University.

~~

Q

How soon will that become finished?

A

I will receive my Bachelor's Degree in April of

this next year of 1988 yes.
Q

So you are not gainfully employed?

A

No not at the current time.

Q

You have no ability to provide medical and

hospitalization insurance?
A

No sir.

Q

I have just handed you something are those notes

that you prepared by yourself? (indicating)
A

Yes.

Q

And those are calculations that you have made based

upon your own records at home?
A Yes.
Q

Now paragraph 8 provided that the defendant should

have the minor children of the parties for the purpose of
Income Tax deductions

for exemptions and you object to that

what portion of the support of the children do you pay or
has been paid from your resources?
A

According to my last couple of years records which

is - -

10

MR. JACKMAN:

I object Your Honor the records

have not been introduced into evidence.
seen them.

I haven't even

She is now testifying to them without foundation,

I think the last couple of years is too broad and the
categories.
THE WITNESS:

I can give them to you if you would

MR. JACKMAN:

That is my objection.

like?

THE CORUT:

Lay some foundation Mr. Fitt if she

is going to testify from that.
BY MR. FITT:
Q

When did you prepare that document?

A

When did I prepare this?

Q

Yes.

A

I prepared it in originally, oh,

I prepared the

financial statement as to what was paid and how much for the
past year in June of this year for the original hearing
which we had in June.
Q

That is on the court's own form?

A

Yes and I took the information home at your request

and went back over it to see if adjustments were needed
and I found it to be correct as far as my records are
concerned.
Q

Now have you itemized then the portion of expenses

that pertain to the children, how many people live in your

11

'-toehold?
A

There are eight of us.

^

And how many persons are involved as far as Mr.

—v^s
A

is concerned?
Five.

Q Three and those three are whom that are not included?
m i

A

Myself , my husband and his son

he has a 14 year old

I j s t - that lives with us.
m i

C
a

v
w

~

All right now will you tell the court how you arrived

these computations without telling him
A

what they are?

I have always kept very careful financial records

^—yti.Tie I pay a bill what the bills are and what I did

i*

t-

H

--solved the children in anyway whether it be you know housirjg,

15

tcsoo% clothing, sports, scouting activities, school

16
17
15
19

I took the last years worth of payments on expenses that

sc

t i v i t e s , and so forth.

ar

°-nt

that had been spent over the last year in each categorj

separately.
as

What I did was I added up the

Those that involved only the children I left

they were and divided the amount by 12 to indicate

20

ncv much was spent over the period of a year.

21

^•-vo!ved also the 14 year old'myself or my husband I divided

22

-

23

—y^^lf or the 14 year old leaving only that proportion which

24

involved only the children and then again divided that by 12.

25

Those that

took out the portion of expenses that involved my husband cj

Then that means that those amounts are 5/8 rather

12

than 8/8?
A

5/8.

Q

What is on the top of your list as far as expenses

are concerned?
MR. JACKMAN:

I will object again Your Honor it

assumes facts that are not in evidence.

It is a summary

apparently some other records and again I haven't seen it
I don't have a copy of it and I don't know what she is talkirjg
about and she is about to testify to.
MR. FITT:

Your Honor he can cross examine and

unless you want her to bring in each and every bill?
THE COURT:

Well

haven't you got copies for Mr.

Jackman?
MR. FITT:

I met with her on Friday and asked

her to prepare it on her own.

I will hand it to Mr. Jackman

if he would like to look at it before she testifies to it?
THE COURT:
from it.

Let him look at it before she testifies

(indicating)
MR. JACKMAN:

There aren't even categories on

it and it just says this amount and this is what it costs.
MR. FITT:

Look at page three and four and five

and on if you would like to look at it.
MR. JACKMAN:

I object Your Honor it is a summary

of I don't know what the categories are she says that I
looked at all these things I decided which were

important

13

and I decided which ones were important, I added them up
and decided if they were right.

If she was given a statement)

on Friday and was compiled it over the weekend we could
have seen it.

I could have seen the checks or whatever

she compiled it from
into evidence.

and they could have been entered

That summary assumes facts not in evidence

and that is the very foundation and basis for it.
no way to cross examine that, no
THE COURT:

I have

way at all.

I think that is accurate Mr. Fitt how

is he going to cross examine unless he has some basic
documents to examine himself
MR. FITT:

to ask questions about.

Well I think we are delaing with a

presumption then Your Honor that she does provide over 51
per cent and unless he can - THE COURT:
MR. FITT:
THE COURT:
presumption

Where does that presumption come from?
I think the IRS has enunciated that.
Exisiting law that makes a

in favor of the custodial parent but

that

doesn't create a presumption for me, just a presumption for
tax purposes for the IRS.
MR. FITT:

Well the hearings that are conducted in thjLS

court are some what different from the ones conducted in
Commissioners Maetani's court and I would like to see some
consistency so we know how to prepare and how to come before
the court.

14

THE COURT: You don't have any surprise in this
court

this is a court of law, he is a commissioner.

Whenever you come in here you have to know that you have to
have some basic documents behind any summary.

It is not

limited to divorce actions or domestic relations matters
but the court is bound by the same rules of civil procedure
everytime we take the bench,
MR. FITT:

Well that hasn't been my experience

even before Commissioner Maetani.
THE COURT:

Well that is not true with Commissioner

Maetani, I am talking about this court or any District
Court.
MR. FITT:

This court may but well I am not going

to argue that with the court.
BY MR. FITT:
Q

What is paid per month for housing?

A

The total housing bill is $284.50.

Q

And you have apportioned that 3/5 as it applies to you

children by Mr. Tross?
A
$279.50

Yes now that housing was until three months ago
so it recently has been raised $5.00

and that is

not incorporated into this figure the raise.
When I figured it I figured that the children's portion o
the housing was $175.00 a month.
Q

What about your food expense what does it amount to in

15

a month?
A

Food expense for the eight of us I do not have the

exact figure here.

It ranges between $350.00 and $400.00

a month depending on the month.
Q

And you have apportioned 5/8 of that to your children

then?
A

And the food and household supplies which includes

cleaning supplies and things of that nature

their portion

I came no $260.00.
THE COURT:

I object on the basis of materiality agsjin

there is really no foundation there is no way I can
know what she is talking about if these are her conclusions.
THE COURT:
MR. JACKMAN:

Well they are her guess right now.
Yes and in that case I don't think

it is material or bears great weight.
THE COURT:

Has about the same validity as

the Financial Statements

that they have that they hand

in on these things don't they.
I am not going to let that become a part of the evidence
but I am going to let her testify if she has done some
calculations on these things if it is a guess it is a guess
and in that way we will have to treat it as such.
BY MR. FITT:
Q

What calculations did you go through in order to

reach the conclusions that have been drawn on your summary?

16

A

In the case of the housing the I took the monthly

mortgage divided it by eight and the figure that came out
I multiplied the figure that came out which was 1/8 of the
mortgage payment times five to indicate the childrens'
portion of it and that left

three portions for myself

and my husband and the 14 year old.
Q

And how did you arrive at your food and household

expenses?
A

I took the amount from my checks that I have written

for purchasing food for a month's period.

I have

averaged it over a year as to how much I spent because
some months it does go a little higher than others.

I

divided . that once again I took the average for the month for]
one month out of the year I divided that by eight and
multiplied that 1/8 number by five to indicate the
childrens' portion.
Q

These came straight out of your checkbook then?

A

Out of my checkbook and I have a ledger which I

have been keeping for ten , eleven years or so to where
I write down all the bills that have paper bills in them
but food things such as food come out of my checkbook.
Q

Did you do the same thing with regard to heat and

electricity and telephone this kind of things?
A

Yes I took the bills that I had received and paid for

the last twelve months.

I averaged the amounts since

17

1

utilities are much higher in the winter than they are in the

2

spring and summer.

3

that average by twelve or divided the figure

4

year's bills by twelve to get an average for the year.

5

then divided that by eight and multiplied

6

figure by five to indicate the children's portion.

7

Q

3

I averaged it over the year and divided
of the total
I

again the 1/8

What other expenses did you take into consideration

when you were doing this calculation?

9 I

A

I took into consideration the cost of dry cleaning

10

and purchasing laundry detergents for clothing.

11

into consideration the amount of money that I spent on buyind

12

clothing for them during that year.

13

the medical payments as far as prescriptions and so forth

14

which I took care of.

15

physicals involved , several medications mostly over the

16

counter drugs there were three or four prescription

17

medications that I paid for and I have those receipts.

18

I took into consideration how much money I paid for

19
20
21

I took

I took into consideratiq

There were a couple of childrens'

life insurance on the children each month.
MR. JACKMAN:

I will object to that

that is not

one of the appropriate expenses?

22

THE COURT:

23

THE WITNESS:

Sustained.
I also took into consideration how

24

much money I have to pay for child care during each month

"

on the few times that I do do child care.

TW

MR. JACKMAN:

Object to that.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

When I have to - Don't answer, the question has been

sustained.
MR. FITT:

Go ahead.

THE COURT:

Well ask her another question.

BY MR. FITT:
Q

What other?

A

Okay I also took into consideration the school

expenses which I have to pay to the elementary school
that the children attend.

That incldues books, school

supplies, that includes special requests by the teachers
for funds to pay for field trips or other type of school
activities which the children are required to pay for.
I took into consideration what the family does their
portion of what the family does for entertainment such - MR. JACKMAN:

I object to that one Your Honor that

is totally out, how do you say that one is not necessary but
it is in a way but that is so discretionary it

really

shouldn't have a bearing on it.
THE COURT:

Not for this particular purpose it

doesn't have a bearing sustained.
THE WITNESS:

I took into consideration the amount cj

money that has been spent on birthday presents and Christmas

19

1

presents for the children?

2

MR. JACKMAN:

3

THE COURT:

Object it is irrelevant..
I think for this purpose it maybe

4

irrelevant because there is no consistency in it I don't

5

know how much it leaves an end open to do whatever

5

to do.

7

you want

I will sustain that objection.
THE WITNESS:

I also took into consideration the

8

cost of gasoline to transport the children back and forth

9

to their activities

IQ

to school or to church activities.

MR. JACKMAN:

Same objection on that one that

U

some of that maybe necessary some of it may not , activities

12

maybe discretionary.

13

walked, who is to say

14

it was not rainy enough
THE COURT:

15

Who is to say when they could have
it was a rainy day, it was too rainy
it is just too open.

Well I understand that but I will

|g

allow that objection overruled.

17

THE WITNESS:

I took into consideration the amount

jg

of money that I have to pay monthly on installment payments

19

to pay off clothing that the children have required or

20

other things that I have had to purchase for them such as

21

furniture.

22

MR. JACKMAN:

I will object to that one that is a

23

double deduction

she can't take off for the cost of clothing

24

on the one hand and take it off as a monthly installment

25

as wel1.

20

1

THE WITNESS:

There is clothing that I have paid

2

cash for that I have check receipts for that is under the

3

other clothing figure.

4

installment is clothing and furniture and needs that the

5

children have which were not covered under the other one

6

which I have had to put on installments because I didn't

7

have the money to pay cash for it at the time.

8
9
I0

H
12

THE COURT:

The clothing that is on my

As long as they are not duplicating

I will allow it.
BY MR. FITT:
Q

Do you understand which ones the court is are there

any other expenses that you need to talk about?

13

A

I think that is basically about it.

14

Q

Now do you recall the ones that the court sustained

15
16
17
18
19

the objection to?
A

Okay the court said that they would not allow the

money that I
Q

paid for life insurance is that correct?

Life insurance,no, child care, no,and also

entertainment activities, no,is there any other?

20

MR. JACKMAN:

Well Your Honor if you take a look a

21

that exhibit it is a monthly summary and I suppose what

22

counsel is going to have her do now is have her estimate

23

based on her estimate what she should take off from the

24

estimate.

This is compounding the inadequacy of that

25

evidence.

Again I don't have anyway to cross examine as to

the other expenses or what they are or anyway to test
her estimate that document just doesn't meet the best eviden4e
test.
THE COURT:

There is no question about it that it

doesn't meet the best evidence test but we ordinarily
accept

sworn statements

expenses.

in these matters as to their total

I will allow her to continue to testify on this

then we will apply the rule of reasons to it.
BY MR. FITT:
Q

Now deducting the amounts that the court has

excluded by sustaining the objections how. much do you spend
on an average per month for the support of those five
children?
A

Okay taking out the life insurance, the child care, ttj

entertainment, they said that they would not accept money
spent on birthday or Christmas presents and I believe
the other one was transportation , auto expenses was the
other one taking those out it comes to a little over
$1,000.00.
Q

How much over a $1,000.00?

A

Approximately $200.00 a month per child.

Right

about a $1,000.00 if these estimates are correct.
Q

And over a period of twleve months what do you averag^

in receipts from Captain Tross for child support?
THE COURT:

$125.00 per child per month.
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MR. FITT:

That is over 10 months.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
expenses

Over a 12 month period - -

Well she doesn't have all these same

for two months.
MR. JACKMAN:

I was going to make that point Your

Honor on cross examination

that needs to be reduced by two

months worth if we are going to compare apples and oranges.
THE WITNESS:

I did not count the months that I do

not buy food for them and stuff in the summer.
MR. JACKMAN:

I maybe mistaken Your Honor I thought

I heard her testify that she took an average month figured
out something and divided it by twelve and multiplied it by
eight and divided

it by five .

I had a hard time following

but I got the impression that it was a 12 month period of
time.
THE WITNESS:

I took the amount that I had spent

on the children over a year's period.

I divided that by

twelve to get an idea of what it would be on a monthly
basis.

I did not divide it

by nine months and twenty days

because I did not count the two months and some odd days that}
the children were not with me.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

Well - I was trying to get a figure to work

with if they were there you know to go on a yearly basis. ItJ
is much easier to work on a yearly basis then on a three
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quarter or whatever basis.
BY MR. FITT:
Q

But your yearly expenses average a little over

$1,000.00 for the per month for all of the children?
A

Yes.

Q

And you receive on an average about $481.00 to $495.0C

a month from Captain Tross is that right?
A

Up until iMay of this year I recieved $600.00 a month

Q

Yes but that would be averaged over the year though?

A

Yes averaged over a year $481.00 a month.

Q

Paragraph 9 orders neither party to record telephone

conversations with the party with the children of the
parties for any reason.

Have you ever recorded

conversations?
A

Yes I did.

Q

What was your purpose in doing that?

A

I had received several phone calls - MR. JACKMAN:

I will object Your Honor is she

claiming that she has a right to record conversations, I
don't understand what the objection to it is?
THE COURT:

I don't either what are you claiming

for this?
MR. FITT:

It is ordered that she not be able to

that she not record telephone conversations.

I don't belief

that there is a requirement that she not be able to if she
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wants to record them if she wants to record them.
THE COURT:

This violates somebody's rights

without their permission.
MR. JACKMAN:

That is against the law she is

recording a third party conversation.

Her children and

her ex husband she is not a party to the conversation
that is a violation of the Privacy Act.
MR. FITT:

That is no more different

a photographic memory and
THE COURT:

than having

able to recount.

I am not even going to quarrel

about that - THE WITNESS

The two conversations that I recorded

MR. JACKMAN

I object she is not testifying - -

THE WITNESS

I recorded the conversation and

I informed Mr. Tross that I was recording the conversation
and he told me he has no problem with it.
THE COURT:

Paragraph 9 will remain as it is.

I find that order will be the same.
BY MR. FITT:
Q

Also paragraph 11 provides that the children be

available to Captain Tross at three additional times
during the calendar year providng he gives you at least
two weeks notice, you have no objection to that you would
just like to have the opportunity to be able to tell him that!
you have another activity planned and you don't want to caned 1
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just because of his visit and maybe do that once in a
year only to perserve the integrity of your existing family
is that right is that correct or what do you feel about
that?
A

I feel that as long as we have no ohter plans there i^

no objection to his visiting at other times with the
children but if a time he gives me happens to have a plan
that we cannot change which has happened in the past then
I do not feel that I should be forced to change our family
or eliminate our family plans.

I think we should have the

right to continue with our family plans whenever possible,
THE COURT:
MR. JACKMAN:

What is the purpose of the two weeks?
Your Honor it was amazing how their

plans became set in concrete as Mr. Tross tried to
do his visitation. Occassionally
Hill Air^Force Base

he can be in the area at

or passing through and what we are

asking for - THE COURT: How far in advance does he know that?
MR. JACKMAN:

Sometimes not very long

sometimes as long as two or three weeks
much notice as we can .

and

we will give as

The purpose of this was to say

that look I will be in the area I will give you two weeks
notification of when I am going to be in the area of the
three at least you know three times

I will be in the area

I will give you as much notice as I can.

On one of those
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occasions you can veto me but on the other two I give you
two weeks notice you make the kids available for me.
problem was for example he moved back from Ohio
was passing through, an inconvenience
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

The

and he

you don't get visitatiorj

He got visitation.
You respond when you are asked a questicj

and counsel will handle that and I don't want any argument
in the court.
MR. JACKMAN:

That was the purpose for that visitation

give her two weeks notice on other occasions other than
specifically provided for

we can't do every other holiday

in the standard type of thing .

There are going to be times

during the year where he may get some leave time and a long
weekend or will be a Hill Air Force Base give her two weeks
notice we don't want her to say "no" that the kids have got
baseball or "no" that we are going on a vacation, you know
those kinds of things.
going to be

We don't know which ones they are

and that is why it is left open.

to have three of those a year

We would like

one of them she can say

"no" for whatever reason she wants and the other two she
needs to accommodate
THE COURT:

us.
Mr. Fitt.

BY MR. FITT:
Q Do you understand my explanation to you what the court
position is concerning the performance of church ordinances?
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THE COURT: Well let's go back to this other
thing and resolve it for just a minute if we can.

Do you ha\|

any comment with regard to this three additional visitations
other than your client says that she doesnTt like it.
She wants the right to veto all three that is what I
understand?
MR. FITT:

No she doesn't want to be able to

veto all three but and she wants to allow visitation.

Her

position is that the contact with Captain Tross has
been such a traumatic experience the reason she recorded
the telephone conversations was because of his yelling at
her and she wanted to be able to prove to somebody
that she is not telling a story.
She would like to have the children have as complete
an association with their father as they possibly can.
THE COURT:

Well I don't see any reason why she

can't hang up the phone if he is being unreasonable.
MR. FITT:

Well that is what I have suggested that

she do.
THE COURT:

But I don't think

you ought to get

yourself in some kind of a jack pot recording telephone
conversations and find yourself in violation of the Federal
Communications Law.
Coming back to this other visitation thing how long
do you generally have when these things happen, Mr. Jackman
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how long does your client generally have in the area

are

we talking about a week, a day or what?
MR. JACKMAN:

Just a long weekend isn't it?

MR. TROSS:

You mean from the Hill Air Force

things ?
MR. JACKMAN:

Well these three visitations how long

would those visits be?
MR. TROSS:
or maybe

A day, a few hours in the evening

two evenings in a row or something like that.
THE COURT:
MR. JACKMAN:
THE COURT:

So we are not talking about long periods)
No.
Well I think it is reasonable the way it]

sits then if we are talking about long periods and the only
other thing that I can say is if you have something planned
such as a family party or a vacation or something that is
planned sometime during that period when he may appear
and you know about that you could give me notice well in
advance that you

were going on this short vacation or you

have this family reunion or whatever so that he can make
his plans accordingly as well so this is not just a one way
street on notice but that ought to be given well in advance
otherwise I think paragraph 11 could remain the same.
Okay go ahead and proceed Mr. Fitt.
BY MR. FITT:
Q

How has your communications with Captain Tross

occurred

29

in the past?
A

I am not sure I understand exactly what you are lookirjg

Q

Whether you had communication either by telephone or

for?

otherwise how has that usually accomplished I guess is what
I am trying to ask you is how peaceable how pleasant are the
communications?
THE COURT:

What are you getting at?

MR. FITT: I am trying to give the court some
understanding as to why there have been difficulties in the
past.

She wants to afford visitation but she

doesn't

want to be bullied.
THE COUET:

Well the order will take care of that I

don't think that she has to be bullied by anybody .
can hang up the phone if he is bullying her.

She

If he comes

there when he is not supposed to be there he is a
tresspasser.

I don't think there is anything

I can

you have a Restraining Order in here don't you? (indicating))
MR. FITT:

No I don't believe so.

THE COURT:

Is there something in there that

is there something in here about

take steps to restrain

third parties and others both parties

refrained from

interfering with the visiation of the other party etc., etc.
does that need to be expanded upon for restraining purposes?
MR. JACKMAN:

Number 6 is pretty broad?
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THE COURT: That is what I thought Tt looked
like it covered it.

Preventing them from contacting

harassing the other parent on behalf of the other parent
or children.
MR. FITT:

Well the business about speaking ill

of the opposing, the other, I guess opposing is a bad
word they have been opposing each other too long and it needs)
to stop.

My client wants to stop it and she doesn't

want to be pushed around.

She doesn't want to be

conciliatory and then pushed beyond the point.
THE COURT:

Well if you want to expand upon the

Restraining Order to make it mutual in terms then I will allcjw
that.
MR. FITT:

Well that would be acceptable but that

is still a very difficult thing to enforce and it usually
ends up being - THE COURT:

I understand that, neither

ff M

I

or

anyone else will be out there with a shot gun to do it.
BY MR. FITT:
Q

Now with regard to child support as it exists

presently you are content to have the amount paid at the currjent
rate that he is paying it that is $181.00, $481.00 per month?|
A

Yes that is fine.

Q

When the Divorce Decree was first entered in Ohio

when did you receive the first child suDport payments
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1

at the beginning of the month or the end of the month?

2

A

I do not remember the exact date in November that

3

he gave me the money for the two weeks in November.

4

did bring cash in the first week of December for the month of|

5

December.

5

MR. JACKMAN:

I object

He

on the grounds that this

7

is totally irrelevant and immaterial *nd I would proffer

3

this we discussed this with regard to the time of keying

9

in this allottment.

If the anniversary of that supplemental

10

agreement is November we would be willing to maintain

11

the $600.00 payments to the anniversary less the two months

12

that needed to be taken out

13

money on that and we will make it right.

14

I

MR. FITT:

and if we owe some different

We calculated that to be about $377.00

15

that includes the $80.00 which she did not , she says that

]g

she didn't receive any $80.00 for the month of June and

17

didn't receive a check and consequently couldn't lose it.

18

We don't dispute that Captain Tross may have sent it or

19

thought he sent it

20

never cleared

21

explained to Mrs. Bartlett the circumstances of being a

22

month late and she still feels that he was on time to begin

23

with and he has used the excuse of the military allottment

24

to be a month late and we feel like he ought to be ordered

25

to pay the $600.00 that he is behind and make that current.

and she never received it and it has

so there is $377.00 owed and also I have
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1

The child support that is due December 1, even thought it

2

is from November's earnings

3

and that is basically the way she would like to have it run.

4

You may cross examine.

5
6

THE COURT:

will be paid in December 1

The original Decree calls for payment or]

the 1st day of each month?

7

MR. JACKMAN:

Your Honor I would refer the court to

8

article 4 , paragraph 2 of the supplemental agreement and

9

it says that the husband shall pay for child support the sum

10

of $120.00 per month per child and said payment shall be

11

paid on a bimonthly basis and it shall be paid by the

12

military allottment.

13

allottment therefore however, the military allotts it is

14

the way it is paid.

15

THE COURT:

16

Paid on a once a month basis right

now isnf t it?

17
18

We would submit that it says by militar]

MR. JACKMAN:

Well it is deducted from his

check twice a month.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. JACKMAN:

But they remit it right?
Right and that is the military

21

allottment and I submit that is what the separation agreement]

22

says.

23

THE COURT:

So the fact that it calls for a bimonthlj

24

basis it is still by military allottment and if they do that

25

once a month then I suppose it is satisfied?
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MR. JACKMAN:

Your Honor I wold submit that bimonthlj

would mean every two months if she would rather go to that I
am sure we can work the allottment out that way.
THE COURT:
MR. FITT:

I am sure it wasn't meant to mean that.
I am sure that the intended meaning

MR. JACKMAN:

- -

Well I understand that you know

if you live by the sword you die by the sword and if you wantj
to get technical and go by what it says that is what
it says and I think the allottment is once a month and that
is what she wants and that is how they take it.
In a sense we pay it semimonthly, it is deducted
from his check semimonthly.
THE COURT:

He doesn't get to enjoy it?

MR. JACKMAN:
THE COURT:

Right.
It is taken from him and he doesn't

have the cash to enjoy for that
MR. FITT:

extra two weeks.

Well in essence then he would be able

to start his allottment three months late and we get
everything three months behind time.
THE COURT:

In essence he hasn't done anything

except starting the allottment right now that pays it I
don't know how much late it is , it comes what within
three or four, five days after the end of the month?
THE WITNESS:

It is automatically deposited on the

30th of each month, on the 30th or 31st.
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MR. JACKMAN:

It is a electronic deposit that goes

into her account.
THE COURT:

Deposit it at the end of each month

Mr. Fitt.
MR. JACKMAN:
MR. FITT:

You are done Mr. Fitt?

Yes.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. JACKMAN:
Q

Mam last year's Christmas vacation was split wasn't

A

Yes he picked up well he picked up the children on

it?

Christmas Day and had them for the 31st yes.
Q

So approximately six days Christmas Day being the 25ttj

through the 31st

about six days?

A * Seven days.
Q

All right and the first half of that Christmas

vacation you had the children?
A

They were out of school I don't remember how many day^

before.
Q

Well but they were with you?

A

Yes.

Q

So it is not a fair statement to say that the

implication was that he had the full Christmas Holidays
last Christmas and that isn't correct it was split between
you?
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A

He had the majority of it I think.

Q

Now did he have visitation within the Christmas

before that when he was in Ohio?
A

Yes he chose not to exercise

it and he didn't come.

Q

No mam , did he visit with the children?

A

No he did not.

Q

What about the year before that?

A

The year before that yes

Q

All right were you living in Ohio at that time?

A

Yes.

Q

All right so it was easy to visit but he wasn't able t|o

he did.

visit with them the year he lived in Ohio and they lived
out here?
A

Not the first winter that we moved out no.

Q

Are you employed?

A

No I am not.

Q

Is your husband employed at this time?

A

Yes he is.

Q

Where does he work?

A

Currently works for 7-11 Corporation.

Q

How much money does he make?
MR. FITT:
THE COURT:

Objection Your Honor it is irrelevant?
I think it is very relevant

when you

come to the not with regard to support but it is very
relevant when it comes to tax exemptions.
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THE WITNESS:

Since he jsut started the job he is

currently making $100.00 a week that is before taxes.
BY MR. JACKMAN:
Q

So then of the family income per month on a monthly

basis you received $400.00

a month from your husband's

employment and $481.00 from Mr. Tross?
A

Up until this last month I received we received it wa^

a little over $1,000.00 a month from my husband's employment
He has just recently been unemployed and his working
this job part time until he gets something else.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

Is that a thousand take home?
That is a thousand take home.

BY MR. JACKMAN:
Q

Now I need to ask you a few questions about this

calculation you did with regard to the monthly expenses
and I am particularly interested with, you know

you divided

everything up I mean you are implying that you took 5/8's
of the living room and you took 5/8fs of the kitchen, you
took 5/8's of the laundry, 5/8's of the garage and all
of that that is the implication that you have .

Do the

children share bedrooms?
A

I took 5/8's of the total cost of paying the house

payments yes.
Q

But do your children, for example, take up 5/8's of

the total square footage or do they share a bedroom, how
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1

many bedrooms are in your house?

2

A

We have five bedrooms.

3

Q

All right and those are occupied all by people

4

or used as a study or a den?

5

A

No.

6

Q

All right do each of your five children by Mr. Tr

7

have their own room?

8 1
9
10
11

A

No not with only five bedrooms they take up three

of the bedrooms.
Q

So to go around and say that they really take up

3/5?s not 5/8fs so the numbers are a little bit allusory

12 I isnf t i t ?
13

A

No I don't think so.

14

Q

Let me ask you about the furniture then you said

15

amortized the cost of the furniture taken 5/8fs of the

16

couches, 5/8fs are you buying any couches or dining

17

room sets on time?

18

A

The only furniture I have bought in the last thre

19

years have been three dressers for the five children .

20

have bought two bunk beds sets which is four beds a piec

21

Q

These are just for your children?

22

A

Just for the children that is the only furniture

23

I have bought in the last three years and most of that

24

has been purchased in the last year except for one dress

25

Q

And that is what you have allocated when you say

these installment payments on furniture that you are charging
5/8's of?
A

Yes.

Q

All right

does this furniture belong to the children

when they turn 18 they can take their beds and go?
A

It is theirs.

Q

I see.

That is all I have.

THE COURT:
MR. FITT:

Anything further Mr. Fitt?
Nothing further Your Honor.

THE COURT:
MR. FITT:

All right, you may step down.
I have nothing further.

THE COURT:

You may proceed Mr. Jackman.

MR. JACKMAN:
THE COURT:

We would call Mr. Tross.
Mr. Tross come forward and be

administered an oath and take the witness stand.
WILLIAM TROSS
called as a witness by and on behalf of the defendant
being first duly sworn was examined and testified as
follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JACKMAN:
Q

Please state your name?

A

William Paul Tross.

Q

And you are the defendant I guess in this particular

matter is that correct?
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A

That is correct,

Q

I first want to ask you a few questions with regard

to what you heard your wife's testimony didn't you with
regard to , two years ago why didn't you visit the children
at Christmas?
A

Well it was a three day journey out to Utah and

a three day journey back and that used up most of the
Christmas visit just in traveling.
Q

You are only entitled to six days?

A

That is right.

It wasn't practical at all only the

summer visitation that made sense.
Q

You desire to visit with them that one time?

A

Yes I missed them a lot.

Q

And is it your desire that you have the visitation

that is coming up?
A

Yes.

Q

And when was the last time you had any extended

visitation with your children?
A

The summer.

Q

All right and so you feel that if you could have the

first Christmas it could make up for the holidays

etc.,

that you have missed?
A

Yes.

Q

Now - THE COURT:

How old are these children?
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THE WITNESS:

The oldest is 12, one is 11, 9,8 and

6.
BY MR. JACKMAN:
Q

You have heard

the allegation that you are behind in

the mortgage payment would you explain to the court how many
payments you are behind?
A

Well three but I guess counting November would be 4.

Q

All right and that you started to go behind

approximately in June of this year?
A

No August.

Q

All right you are right.

All right why did you stop

making the payments?
A

Well we had tenants in there who left without

notice.

I talked to the bank about my problem and they

said that they would consider a deed in lieu but in order
to qualify for a deed in lieu I had to be behind in my
payments and so they said that to stop making the payments.
Q

So you did that?

A

Yes.

Q

Are you now considering a deed in lieu?

A

Yes they are.

Q

Are they encouraging that they are going to do it?

A

Yes the bank is and the V.A. has to get into it and

they have to approve it and the bank and the V.A. are working)
together and they said that the V.A. is very slow at this.
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1
2

Q

All right now if they take a deed in lieu

will there

be any deficiency?

3

A

No.

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

The bank will be paid off.

6

Q

So you are just simply waiting for that to happen?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Now with regard to the Christmas vacation you are

9
JO

agreeable to having it start one day after the school ends
and have them back one day before the school begins?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And this would be because for example if December

13

31st occurred on a Wednesday

14

days say in vacation

there would be a number of four!

before the children had to be back?

15

A

Right.

16

Q

So that is your desire then?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

To have them back, take them day after

so they would

19

have time to get ready and to bring them back at least the

20

day before so they would have time to unwind?

21

A

Right.

22

Q

We had an objection on the church ordinances

23

do you

want me to address that I don't think Mr. Fitt covered that.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. JACKMAN:

No he didn't cover that.
All right.
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MR. FITT:

I accepted what the court said in chamber]

on the subject and I felt it wasn't worth going into.
THE COURT:

Well that is good reasoning.

BY MR. JACKMAN:
Q

Now do you have any problems with the

health

insurance or the previous order of the court with regard
to extraordinary expenses?
A

Yes I was getting bills for routine illnesses like

an ear infection and doctor's visit of $20.00 and medication
for $8.95 in essence I was getting every single medical bill
that the kids had.
Q

And was it your request that you would like to have

some help from the court as to what is an extraordinary
expense would be?
A 'Yes.
Q

And is it also your request that if health insurance

is available to Mrs. Bartlett at no cost to her that
the children could be carried on that as well?
A

Yes.

Q

In other words try and work it out so whatever the

best possible package for all concerned could be provided?
A

That is right the insurance that covers the children

let's use it.
Q

Mr. Tross you have retained me to be your attorney

is that correct?

n'i>r%

A

That is correct,

Q

And what was our agreement with regard to attorney

fees?
A

Well that I would pay you $90.00 an hour.

Q

That is all Your Honor.
THE COURT:

You may cross examine.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. FITT:
Q

The prior visitation that Christmas visitation that

you missed you elected not to come because of the time
constraints then?
A

The time yes.

Q

Airlines can get you out the same day?

A

At a great expense.

Q

But still can get you out that same day?

A

Sure.

Q

And there is some expense to driving anyway is there

A

That is correct.

Q

Where do you stay when you come

not?

here to Utah to

visit the children?
A

I don't visit the children here for the extended peric)

of time if I am in for a day I have a friend in Sandy, Utah
that I stay with.
Q

When did you contact the finance department in order
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to execute this existing allottment?
A

The end of July beginning of August,

Q

How long does it take for them end of July the

beginning of August?
A

Right.

Q

When did you return the children?

A

In the middle of August.

Q

So you actually instituted the agreement before they

returned them then?
A

I think I probably took care of it right after I

got back I actually had a couple of weeks until September
the 1st.
Q

Now you are hopeful that this deed in lieu will take

place is that correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

What happens

A

Well then I guess the bank will foreclose.

Q

And what about the deficiency?

A

I don't know that much about it I guess there will

if it doesn't?

be one.
Q

Now you are in agreement

if there is a deficiency

and Mrs. Bartlett is unable to pay it then she is going to
lose her V.A. benefits as far as home loans are concerned?
MR. JACKMAN:
legal conclusion

I object I think that calls for a

how he would know that.

I don't know that
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THE COURT:
MR. JACKMAN:
not I mean if he knows

Do you know that?
I don't know whether that is a fact or:
I guess he can answer but I think

that calls for a legal conclusion.
THE COURT:

Tf he knows I guess he can answer.

Well I suppose more than a legal conclusion it calls for
policy conclusion whatever their policy is with regard
to that if he knows the policy?
MR. JACKMAN:

Well I think it also goes to the

circumstances around the deficiency and how it was incurred
and there is a lot to it.
THE COURT:

There again maybe so I don't know but

if he knows the policy I will let him testify, he probably
doesn't know.
THE WITNESS:

I don't know the policy Your Honor.

BY MR. FITT:
Q

Did you have a piece of real property in Arizona or

some place else?
A

I had at one time.

Q

And did your V.A. Loan 20 for buying it?

A

My V.A. entitlement ves it did.

Q

Your V.A. Entitlement did?

A

Yes a portion of it.

Q

Is it your V.A. entitlement

A

A portion of them are yes because the loan is still

still tied up with that?

46

under I guess the original person that I sold it to and
they haven't paid their loan off yet and they still have
got 10 years to go.
Q

So when you bought the house in Ohio

you didn't have

any V.A. entitlements to buy it in your own name then is
that right?
A

I didn't have enough correct.

Q

Okay

at least you do understand that there are

limitations on your ability to exercise the V.A. entitlement
depending on what you have got committed already?
A

Right.

Q

You don't know whether or not the deficiency judgment

or the deficiency against her would deprive her of any
further V.A. entitlement do you?
A

I don't know for a fact no.

Q

Would you be willing to return the children two days

beofre they return to school on the Christmas holidays?
A

No I think one day is fine.

Q

So you are not willing to return them two days?

A

No.

Q

Ahead of time?

A

No only every other year.

Q

Well the question of unwinding.

No further questions

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Anything further Mr. Jackman?
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MR. JACKMAN:

I just want to make sure that I haven

missed anything it is just kind of jumbled up.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JACKMAN:
Q

Mr. Tross it is your desire to take the children

for income tax deductions purposes isn't it?
A

Yes that is correct.

Q

Since this is a pre 1984 Decree it is your request

that the court order compliance with that if you are
awarded some of the deductions is that correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

I also need to inquire of you with regard to the

you heard some testimony regarding telephone calls and
the visitation and etc., you want you are agreeable to this
mutual restraining order not to harass each other etc?
A

Yes.

Q

And in the other respects that we have talked about ycju

are in agreement with the recommendations by the Commissioner]
and would ask the court to , you understand them and to
implement them?
A

Yes.

Q

Even to the extent that some of them are not exactly

what you wanted to begin with?
A

That is correct.

Q

You are not making this appeal?
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A

No.

Q

Thank you that is all?
THE COURT:
MR. FITT:

Anything further Mr. Fitt?
Yes.
RECROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. FITT:
Q

What is your income annually?

A

It is approximately $38,000.00 a year.

Q

Is that total entitlements?

A

Yes.

Q

That takes into consideration basic allowance for

quarters and basic allowance for

rations that you are not

taxed?
A

That is correct.

Q * You don't receive any incentive pay, flight pay,
or any hazardous duty pay of any kind?
A

No.

Q

What does that leave you on a monthly basis after

taxes?
MR. JACKMAN:

I will object to that Your Honor

that would go to the question of child support or alimony
or something like that the gross income is relevant for
income tax deductions purposes but irrelevant for anything
else that is before the court?
THE COURT:

What are you claiming for this?
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MR. FITT:

Well it is our position that $90.00

approximately per month per child is really a small
amount for a person who is earning $38,000.00 and can afford
to pass up if that is the only issue the income deductions
on that.
THE COURT:

Well you heard my feelings about that ar)

that is that I am concerned about creating the largest streair)
of cash flow for the benefit of the children and I donft see
any reason to forego anything if we can avoid it and
pay the government.

I realize you get your money from the

government but I think they have got their hand in their
pocket as deep as I would like to see it.

I don't see

any reason to make an order that would allow them to stick
it in there any deeper.
Right now there is no question , I mean there is only
$430.00 gross going into your client's household.

She is

not employed and her husband is making about $430.00 a month
and I expect that will go up.
MR. FITT:

We are dealing with what happened over thje

entire year however Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Well even

A $1,000.00 a month

his take home pay was $1,000.00 a month her testimony is
that it costs a $1,000.00 a month to keep the kids.

I don't

know how they keep the other three if that is all there is.
I am applying

the rule of reason now.
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1

MR. FITT:

2

I can't be a witness they are my

neighbors and I know they are not extravagant.

3

THE COURT:

Well I am not saying that they are

4

extravagant all I am saying is that the testimony

c

before this court is that it costs

g

to keep five children and yet the testimony is that

7

before he was laid off and was bringing money home it was onl

8

a $1,000.00 a month.

9

can't possibly be because a $1,000.00 a month is

Now simple mathematics tell you that

obviously taking care of 8 people and not 5.

10

My order with regard to taxes is not going to be set

11

in concrete however.

12
13

MR. JACKMAN:

j4 I

THE COURT:

15

We understand that Your Honor.
Because conditions may change which

may

jg
17

a $1,000.00 a month

MR. JACKMAN:

Something inbetween maybe appropriate

down the line?

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. FITT:

I think so.
Your Honor I have no further cross

20 I examination and my client would have - 2i I

THE COURT:

22

MR. FITT:

You may step down
I wasn't aware of this

and she would

23

testify

and if the court wants to hear that , that she

24

receives scholarship money to the tune of approximately

25

$ 5 0 0 . 0 0 a month

and h a s f o r t h e p a s t few y e a r s

w h i l e she ha

been going to school.
THE COURT:

Does she pay that on her books and

tuition?
MRS. MARY BARTLETT:

Over and above what they pay fcj

books and tuition that was after books and tuition.
MR. FITT:

Basically living money.

THE COURT:

Is that scholarship or V.A.?

MRS. MARY BARTLETT:

Scholarship I have not been

entilted to V.A.
MR. FITT:

That would be it Your Honor.

MR. JACKMAN:

Is that taxable?

MRS. MARY BARTLETT:

No. The extra $500.00

per month that I receive was supposed to be used towards
paying my houshold expenses while I was in school and that
is what is was used for and as long as it was being used
for household expenses

and I could show them by my records

that is what it was used for
THE COURT:

it was not taxable.

Brings us back to about the same

position with the same gross being taxes.
MR. JACKMAN:

I would ask to be sworn with regard

to attorney fees and may I testify from here?
THE COURT:

Yes.
RICK JACKMAN

first being duly sworn testified regarding attorney fees.
THE COURT:

You may proceed.
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MR. JACKMAN:

Your Honor I have prepared an

affidavit with regard to attorney fees and I have extracted
from my time records by date and amount that we bill I didn't
put down the hours but the hours is divided by 92 and
would come out with tenths and so we bill in money not in
time and I have prepared attorney fees and they come to a
total of $1,420,50.
I would also testify that we cost $30.00 for the
counter petition in this matter as a filing fee and then
we had reporter's fee of $146.40 which would be the
cost in this matter.
With regard to the matter I would testify that the case
itself has been a little more difficult because of the
initial antagonism between the parties we had to take her
deposiiton we responded to a set of interrogatories . We
reviewed interrogatories that she sent to the real estate
agent with regard to

those issues.

We also prepared for the pretrial hearing and I think
we were successful at the pretrial hearing both in defending
against the allegations in the petition and substantiating
our allegations in the counter petition.
We have also had to prepare the order in that case for
the recommendations.

We responded

to the objection

that was filed in the recommendation and again it was found
in our favor.

Again that was objected to and responded
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again and so the case has been a little bit extensive in
attorney fees.
I have felt and would submit to the court my affidavit
and my bill of costs.
MR. FITT:

You say that the costs maybe increased

because of the antagonism between the parties?
MR. JACKMAN:

Well we just felt that initially

that the deposition is expensive we charged $145.00
for the deposition and $145.00 for the reporter's fee and
we felt that it would be impossible to obtain the information)
that we needed by way of written interrogatories and that
was based on a previous conversation that I had with Mrs.
Bartlett wherein her husband got on the line and it was the
allegations that my client had made to me with regard to
her being uncooperative were true.

So we felt that a deposition

was the way to do it which was a little more expensive than
normally do in this kind of a case.
MR. FITT:

But there is an antagonism between

the parties?
MR. JACKMAN:

I would dare say that they are not

in love anymore.
MR. FITT:

No further questions, Your Honor and I

would like to call Mrs. Bartlett for the purpose of
rebuttal on that Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.
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MARY BARTLETT
called as a rebuttal witness by and on behalf of the
plaintiff being previously sworn was examined and testified
as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR, FITT:
Q

Mr. Jackman made reference to the fact that there

is antagonism between you and Mr. Tross, how do the
telephone calls with Mr. Tross usually go what is the usual
tenor of those calls?
A

Most of the time when we have talked on the phone - MR. JACKMAN:

I object Your Honor I don't see

most of the time, foundation name a specific time, place.
THE WITNESS

I don't remember dates.

MR. JACKMAN

I can't respond to most of the time.

THE WITNESS

I don't remember specific dates he

has called.
THE COURT:

Little broad but I am going to allow her]

to testify, go ahead.
THE WITNESS:
got divorced

Even for many years before we ever

telephone calls generally resulted in

there

is no other way to put it except a lot of yelling and
screaming

and name calling and in most cases I began quite

a few years ago to hang up on him when he would start yellind
because I knew that once he started yelling it was impossible
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to talk to him I would hang up.
Q

Has that continued since the divorce?

A

Yes sir.

Q

Now the telephone call that you received from Mr.

Jackman would you tell the court what you how that conversation
went what you can recall?
A

Once he had identified himself he immediately started

to threaten me with legal action if I did not allow Mr. Tros^
to come and pick up the children the next day.

I tried

for a quite a period of time to get through his yelling
and his accusations to tell him that there
no problem

was going to be

with Mr. Tross picking up the children on the

next day as scheduled in the Decree even though we felt
due to a prior agreement that he should pick them up the
morning of the 26th but when we were finally able I lost
my temper I got tired of getting yelled at and I hang up the
phone.
Q

Were you yelled at by Mr. Jackman?

A

Yes and I had hung up the phone and I found out later

that my husband had picked up the phone about the same time
I had hung it up and after 15 minutes of trying to get
Mr. Jackman to quit yelling at him he finally got it through
his head that there was not going to be any problem

we didn!

anticipate any problem but it took him that long to calm
him down.
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Q

And you did go to the deposition is that right?

A

Yes I did.

Q

How would you say that you were treated by Mr. Jackmarj

during that deposition?
A

He was rude and obnoxious.

Q

Okay.

A

He spent most of the time arguing with me because

he didn't like the answers I was giving.
Q

No further questions.
THE COURT:

Any cross exmination?

MR. JACKMAN:

Yes.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. JACKMAN:
Q

Mrs. Bartlett my understanding was is that you were

going 'to deny Mr. Tross one day of visitation because
he kept the kids one day too late on the prior visitation
is that correct?
A

No that had nothing to do with it.

Q

That is what you told me isn't it?

A

No it is not.

Q

I have no further questions.
MR. FITT:

Nothing further.

THE COURT:
MR. JACKMAN:

You may step down.
Your Honor I don't know that it

matters that much but the reason for the phone call was that

3/

my client reported to me that she was going to have him
come to show up a day late becuase he had the kids one
extra day in the visitation before.

I would also submit

that there were no threats other than the fact that I simply
stated if she did not cooperate with the terms of the
Decree we would take whatever legal action would be
appropriate.

That is all I have other than , that is all

we have.
MR. FITT:

Really with the sole exception of the issjue

regarding the income tax deductions

we wouldn't be in court

except for Mr. Tross's conduct toward Mrs. Bartlett.

She has)

been oppressed by him for many years and she just doesn't
want to put up with anymore.
visit

She wants her children to

their father and she wants to get on with her life

she doesn't want to have this kind of thing continue and
then she doesn't want to be yelled at by him or by his
lawyer or by anybody else .
I attended the deposition

and I have a lot of respect

for Rick Jackman but this is the rudest deposition that
I have ever particiapted in and I on several occasions I toldj
him I was going to close it and ask that it be brought
into court rather than have him persist in arguing with
her and yelling at her.

So there are feelings but I think

in this case Mrs. Bartlett is the victim of the hard feelings!
and she is attempting to assert her own for her own protection.
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MR. JACKMAN:

The court has heard our argument

and you know where we are at.

I don't want to rehash

it and I don't want to go through it.
is that

I would make this suggestion I think Mr. Tross

is entitled to some attorney fees.
the economic situation
in

The only thing

However I appreciate

that the parties find themselves

and if we got a judgment for attorney fees I feel it

would be moot in terms of its collectibility.
However with regard to the visitation I think we have
heard what the court has said and heard the evidence and
I think if I could fair it out at all it seemed to be weeding
its way out.
I would suggest however, that perhaps and we even have
gone so for to even agree to the arrearage this other
$600.00 per month, the $119.00 per month as of some
$300.00 or $400.00.
I would make this suggestion to the court that perhaps
that would be an appropriate way to offset that against
some of Mr. Tross's attorney fees and his costs.
of the matter is in this case is that when it

The fact

went to

Commission Maetani the petition was not affirmed the
counterclaim was.

Then was objected to and proffers were

made and supplemental arguments were made

pretty much the

recommendation was adhered to and we would submit that
I think the court today I hope is going to rule in a way that
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1

is going to be favorable to the questions that Mr. Tross

2

has been presenting.

3

He hasnTt made unreasonable demands.

I am sorry that she doesn't like me and that I am rude

4

and obnoxious

5

to some sort of a break attorney fees is really the issue

6

that bothers me he has had to travel up here several times

7

and I think it would be a good time to offset some of this

8

stuff she is talking about but I think the rest of it

9

is pretty clear.

10

but that is her opinion.

MR. FITT:

He is entitled

Again the difficulty is that and I

H

feel it is more his fault because of the problems

12

and a lot of these problems could have been resolved if

13

he had been in a mood to talk and listen rather than argue

14

and if Mr. Jackman is able to garnish the child support

15

to get' his attorney fees if the court choses to award them

16

then the court I think is entitled to offset but this

17

money that is owed is the children1t money and not Mrs.

18

Bartletts.

19
20
21

MR. JACKMAN:

Then give me a judgment I am trying

to be fair.
THE COURT:

Okay making reference to Commissioner's

22

Maetani's supplemental order apparently there is no problem

23

with paragraph one and two.

24

to leave that the same and if Mr. Tross can avail himself

25

with the cooperation of Mrs. Bartlett to give a deed in lieu

Paragraph three I am going

W

that is the thing to do otherwise I am leaving it then you
might just simply add to that both parties shall
reasonably pursue the deed in lieu of foreclosure to avoid
any deficiency otherwise it can stay the same.
With regard to Christmas vacation was that changed
later.

Paragraph five?
MR. JACKMAN:
THE COURT:

Paragraph four.
Well yes paragraph four.

MR. JACKMAN:

No I think that is 5:00 P.M. on the

day the vacations begins that would be the day.
THE COURT:

I am going to modify that and he can

pick them up one day after they are out of school return them
one day prior

that would be 24 hours.

So when they are

out of school 24 hours he can pick them up

and can return t\\ em

24 hours prior to when they go back to school whether that
is the 31st or whatever day

that

might be.

It might be

that the first comes on a Friday and then you will have the
second and the third and so will be entitled to keep them
over to that point, 24 hours prior.
I am going to award the 1987 Christmas visit to the
plaintiff.
MR. JACKMAN:
THE COURT:

That is to Mrs. Bartlett?
Mrs. Bartlett.

quarrels about the summer vacation?

Have you got any
We pretty well resolvecj

that number elevent didn't we that will remain the same.
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With regard to paragraph five Mr. Fit
informed your client

you have

I think that it is this court's opinion!

that the father who is worthy should have the first
opportunity to confer upon his children the church
ordinances and that doesn't mean they have to wait around
an inordinate length of time anything of that sort when
that time comes if he can afford himself of that opportunity
of course if the children are willing I don't want to have
an unwilling child but he should have that first opportunity.
MR. FITT:

The language of five should be modified

some what really quite fixed in concrete
THE COURT:

the way it is.

Well yes I think we can modify that and

say that the first opportunity because I don't you know
if he is out of the country or some other place and
the child turns 12 and is to receive the Priesthood
I would hesitate to have that child to wait two or three or
four months to do that even though that might be a nice
thing for the father to do it it kind of puts the child out
in a situation where he is not on equal grounds with his
peers it is a bit of a problem.
MR. JACKMAN:

Add that language then

William P.

Tross shall be entitled the opportunity to perform.
THE COURT:

I think that would be satisfactory.

You can expend upon Paragraph six with regard to an
additional restraining language restraining that and it shoull

62

be mutual.
Paragraph seven in this case I am going to have the
defendant provide the hospita1ization and dental insurance
however, if the plaintiff becomes employed and there is
a medical insurance available through her employment without
additional expense to her she will add the children to that
medical insurance policy and you may add that language.
MR. JACKMAN:

What about uncovered expenses.

The original Decree talks about extraordinary expenses.
THE COURT:

Well I don't know what the

government has but I think they cover all extraordinary
expenses

don't they?
MR. JACKMAN:

That is basically our point they

don't cover things like ear drops for example and we
wnat to avoid the situation where well if it is going to be
covered we will have to go to the Emergency Room as opposed
to the family doctor.
THE COURT:

You are talking about extraordinary

I thought you meant something

that is going to be very

expensive?
MR. JACKMAN:

That is what we think it means but

the problem that we have that is not the way it has been
operating when he would get, he talked about a bill ,
talked about getting a bill for ear drops obviously that
is not extraordinary.

When we get a $20.00 bill in the mail
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that is not an extraordinary expense.
THE COURT:

Well those items which are not

covered by insurance and the parties should split that
amount.
MR. JACKMAN:

That will be a cap on it. Maybe

we ought to add that language if she could get them
to a military olace

for braces

or something

it is

worth the trip to Hill Air Force to cover a major expense
like that.
THE COURT:

You may have the language there as to

that.
I am going to award the income tax deductions to the
defendant for 1987 and unless

and that is provided that

he is current with his child support.
for his child support

If he is current

in 1988 I am going to award

him the tax exemptions for 1988 because the plaintiff will
not graduate until April of 1988.

Her husband is in the

process of lifting himself up in a new position so it
appears that through 1988 certainly the plaintiff will be
or rather the defendant,wil1 be putting out the bulk
of the money.
Following the year 1988 I don't have a formula but
following the year 1988 I think the parties should be ordered
to cooperate with regard to tax exemptions and possibly
split tax exemptions so that the plaintiff has some and the
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defendant has some based some what on the ratio of the
total incomes that are coming into both households and the
total parties that are being supported by those incomes
and that is going to require a little cooperation but I thin^
it is well worth it to sit down and think about it when
you do it.

You may also add the language

to the extent

that the cooperation creates the greatest cash flow
to the two families for the purpose of rearing the children.
I am going to leave the military allottment as it is
she gets it at the end of the month instead of the first
of the month.

It is electronically placed into her

bank account on the 30th or the 31st so it is not a full
month late.

It is just a couple of weeks late part of

it and I am going to leave that as it is.
Under the circumstances specifically Mr. Jackman with
your position of attorney fees however, realistically it
would be a big burden

to lay them on the plaintiff at

this time I am going to have each party pay their own
attorney fees.
MR. JACKMAN:

Number eleven is okay that is the threje

week visitation?
THE COURT:
MR. FITT:
THE COURT:
MR. FITT:

Yes I think we indicated that was okay.
Three times?
Three times upon giving notice.
There ought to be an added provision in

6D

there if Mrs. Bartlett has plans or something that she
notify Captain Tross so that she would be aware in advance.
THE COURT:

If she has something planned which

has some family implications such as I mentioned family
reunions, a family vacation that she is aware of and it
is

planned

in advance she should communicate that to Mr.

Tross so that he is aware of and that those times would
be automatically eliminated.

I am not saying that they

ought to be a lot of them and they maybe one a year or
something like that she might have planned and if she can
let him know several weeks or months in advance

that is what

I would like to see done so that he knows that is going
to happen and not get into a big argument when she has
planned it for three months but hasn't communicated it to
him and he happens to come up and they clash just as sure
as we are sitting here that is exactly what will happen.
MR. JACKMAN:

I want to make sure that I understand

what about the "arrearage'1 the $119.00 for the two months
and the $80.00?
THE COURT:

Whatever arrearage is Mr. Tross you

pay that current, didn't you agree to do that.
MR. JACKMAN:

We suggested than and also suggest thajt

be offset against the attorney fees since he has incurred
quite an expense and it is money out of his pocket and he has!
had to come up three times and that is only $300.00?
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THE COURT:

To that extent I will allow the

offset.
MR. FITT:
children
obtain

Your Honor that money belongs to the

not to Mrs. Bartlett and if Mr. Jackman were to
any kind of a judgment for attorney fees he could

not garnish - THE COURT:

I am not going to allow it as a judgment]

I am going to allow it as an offset.

I know what you are

saying, however, I think you are going to soon see a situaticj
where if the mother is a custodial parent and visitation is
not allowed you are going to see the right to offset that
with support money that is on its way.
MR. FITT:

Sh'e is not denying visitation Your Honor.

THE COURT:

I know but I am just saying that is the

same philosophy

that is still the chidlren's money, current

philosophy is that is the kid's money you can't use
visitation as a right to offset that what I am saying.
MR. FITT:

I still feel that Captain Tross is

as much responsible for the hard feelings in fact more
so than

causes us to be here rather than be able to

reach a settlement on this thing.
MR. JACKMAN:

With the court's

permission could

I simply state in the order that the reduced allottment
is to begin as of August of 1987 and then there will be
no arrearage.
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THE COURT:
MR. FITT:

What about that Mr. Fitt.
Captain Tross gets his cake and gets

to eat it to Your Honor and I really feel that it is unfair
as far as the children are concerned and heavens know
they need the money now.
THE COURT:

Yes I understand.

MR. JACKMAN:

Well Judge we are back to square

one if they hadn?t objected twice

and come here today

there would have been money available.
MR. FITT:

And we wouldn't still be getting

$377.00 unless we brought him back to the court on it Your
Honor, we are still stuck between a rock and a hard place.
If there had been no objection then we wouldn't be, he
would have arbitrarily decided to make it to make a change
and then still have planned.
MR. JACKMAN:

That is not true she brought the

complaint she lost at the Commissioner's level and she lost
on the reconsideration and I think we have spent three and
a half hours

here plus

another two hours preparing

for this and he just doesn't have the money to be honest
with you to make up the back arrearage with the expenses
of coming up here and you know he has used up most of his
visitation now fighting in court.
THE COURT:

It is fair.

I think in view of the circumstances

where this is the third time in court and it seems some of
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these things could ahve been worked out to shorten the
time let my order remain as I have made it.

Anything

further.
MR. FITT:

Nothing

MR. JACKMAN:
THE COURT:

your Honor.

Who would you like to prepare it?
You prepare it give it to Mr. Fitt under)

Rule 2.9 for his approval.
MR. JACKMAN:
THE COURT:
MR. FITT:

Thank you.
And then submit it to the court.

Thank you.

THE COURT:

If nothing further court will be

in recess.
THE BAILIFF:

Please arise court will be in recess.

(WHEREUPON, this matter was concluded)
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l>y me in Stenotype, and thereafter caused by me to be
transcribed into typewriting by Richard C. Tatton and that
*\ full, true and correct transcription of said HEARING
Was so taken,
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or otherwise
Associated with any of the parties to said cause of action
'irid that I am not interested in the event thereof.
WITNESS my hand and official seal at Midway, Utah,
'his

/f*

day of January, 1988.

RICHARD C. TATTON, CSR
My commission expires:
June 15, 1989
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